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Abstract: Basis risk – the remaining risk that an insured individual faces – is widely 
acknowledged as the Achilles Heel of index insurance, but to date there has been no direct 
study of its role in determining demand for index insurance. Further, spatiotemporal variation 
leaves open the possibility of adverse selection. We use rich longitudinal household data from 
northern Kenya to determine which factors affect demand for index based livestock insurance 
(IBLI). We find that both price and the non-price factors studied previously are indeed 
important, but that basis risk and spatiotemporal adverse selection play a major role in 
demand for IBLI.  
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I. Introduction 
Risk management interventions have become a priority for development agencies as the enormous cost 
of uninsured risk exposure, especially to the rural poor, has become increasingly widely appreciated. 
Improved risk management through innovative insurance products is hypothesized to crowd in credit access, 
induce investment, support informal social transfers, and generally stimulate growth and poverty reduction 
(Hess et al. 2005; Skees, Hartell & Hao 2006; Barrett et al. 2007; Barnett, Barrett & Skees 2008; Boucher, 
Carter & Guirkinger 2008; Skees & Collier 2008; Giné & Yang 2009; Hellmuth et al. 2009; Karlan et al. 
2014). Although insurance products offer a proven means to manage risk through formal financial markets, 
asymmetric information problems—adverse selection and moral hazard—and high fixed costs per unit 
insured effectively preclude conventional indemnity insurance for smallholder crop and livestock farmers 
in developing countries.  
Index insurance products have flourished over the past decade as a promising approach to address these 
obstacles. Index insurance products use easily observed, exogenous signals to provide coverage for 
covariate risk. Anchoring indemnity payments to external indicators, not policyholder’s realized losses, 
eliminates the need to verify claims, which is particularly costly in remote areas with poor infrastructure 
and clients with modest covered assets, and mitigates the familiar incentive challenges associated with 
moral hazard and adverse selection that plague traditional insurance. These gains do come at the cost, 
however, of “basis risk”, defined as the residual risk born by insurees due to the imperfect association 
between experienced losses and indemnification based on index values. Furthermore, a form of adverse 
selection may remain if prospective purchasers have information about upcoming conditions that affect 
insured, covariate risk – such as climate forecasts – but that information is not incorporated into the index 
insurance product’s pricing (Carriquiry & Osgood 2012). 
The explosion of interest in index insurance has resulted in a proliferation of pilot programs across the 
developing world. A burgeoning literature addresses various aspects of theoretical and applied concerns in 
the design, implementation, and assessment of index insurance products (Barnett & Mahul 2007; Barrett et 
al.2007; Binswanger-Mkhize 2012; Chantarat et al. 2007; Clarke 2011; Miranda & Farrin 2012). Despite 
the celebrated promise of index insurance, uptake in pilot programs around the globe has been generally 
low, and there are as of yet no examples of clear success stories with demonstrable capacity for scalability 
or sustainability over the long run (Smith & Watts 2010; Hazell & Hess 2010; Leblois & Quiron 2010). As 
a result, most empirical research on index insurance in developing countries has focused on identifying the 
barriers to insurance uptake. Although demand appears to be price sensitive, as expected, studies find 
considerable variation in the price elasticity of demand, ranging from -0.44 to -1.16 (Mobarak & 
Rosenzweig 2012; Cole et al. 2013; Hill, Robles & Ceballos 2013). And, with the exception of the Ghanaian 
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farmers studied by Karlan et al. (2014), uptake has been low even at heavily subsidized prices.1 With 
evidence that price plays only a small part in determining demand, researchers have turned to examining 
the role of household-specific non-price factors. Risk aversion, wealth, financial liquidity, understanding 
of the product, trust in the provider, and access to informal risk pooling commonly exhibit significant, 
although sometimes inconsistent, impacts on demand (Giné, Townsend & Vickery 2008; Chantarat, Mude 
& Barrett 2009; Pratt, Suarez & Hess 2010; Cai, de Janvry & Sadoulet 2011; Clarke 2011; Janzen, Carter 
& Ikegami 2012; Liu & Myers 2012; Mobarak & Rosenzweig 2012; Cole et al. 2013; McIntosh, Sarris, & 
Papadopoulos 2013; Dercon et al. 2014).  
Although basis risk and the possibility of spatiotemporal adverse selection are widely understood as 
prospective weaknesses of index insurance, the empirical research has thus far not directly explored the 
role that either of these product-specific factors plays in influencing product uptake. But if the insurance 
index is imperfectly correlated with the stochastic welfare variable of interest (e.g., income, assets), then 
index insurance may offer limited risk management value; indeed it can increase, rather than decrease, 
purchasers’ risk exposure (Jensen, Barret & Mude 2014a). Furthermore, prospective purchasers may 
perceive that an index insurance product is mispriced for their specific location or for the upcoming season, 
given information they have on covariate risk for the insured period and place.  
Both of these problems exist generally in index insurance contracts and either might adversely affect 
uptake. Yet the impact of these prospective weaknesses in index insurance products has not been carefully 
researched to date, although a few studies use coarse proxies for idiosyncratic risk (Karlan et al. 2014; 
Mobarak & Rosenzweig 2012). This lacuna arises primarily because the vast majority of products fielded 
to date remain unable to determine the level of basis risk inherent in their product design; the products were 
designed from data series on index variables (e.g., rainfall, crop growth model predictions), not from 
longitudinal household asset or income data from the target population to be insured. 
This paper fills that important gap, exploiting an unusually rich longitudinal dataset from northern Kenya 
and the randomization of inducements to purchase index-based livestock insurance (IBLI), a product 
designed from household data to minimize basis risk (Chantarat et al. 2013), in order to identify the impact 
of basis risk and spatiotemporal adverse selection on index insurance uptake. We further distinguish 
between the two central components of basis risk, design error – associated with the imperfect match 
between the index and the covariate risk the index is meant to match – and idiosyncratic risk – individual 
variation around the covariate experience. Design error can be reduced by improving the accuracy of the 
index, while idiosyncratic risk inherently falls outside the scope of index insurance policies.  
                                                   
1 
The high demand for rainfall insurance in Ghana is somewhat of a mystery.  Karlan et al. (2014) point to the role that insura nce grants and 
indemnity payments play, but those same processes have been observed elsewhere unaccompanied by similar levels of demand.  
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Echoing the prior literature, we find that price, liquidity, and social connectedness affect demand in the 
expected ways. In addition, we find that basis risk and spatial adverse selection associated with division 
average basis risk dampen demand for IBLI. Households in divisions with greater average idiosyncratic 
risk are much less likely to purchase insurance than those in divisions with relativity more covariate risk. 
Design error also plays a role in demand, reducing uptake and increasing price sensitivity among those who 
purchase coverage. But between the two components of basis risk, design risk plays a much smaller role, 
reducing uptake by an average of less than 1% (average marginal effect [AME] =-0.0073, Std. Err.= 0.0025) 
while the division average covariance between individual and covariate losses effects uptake by nearly 30% 
on average (AME = 0.2964, Std. Err.=0.1617). Consequently the basis risk problem is not easily overcome 
through improved product design. There is also strong evidence of intertemporal adverse selection as 
households purchase less coverage, conditional on purchasing, before seasons for which they expect good 
conditions (AME=-0.2709, Std. Err.=0.0946). This impact represents an 11.2% reduction in average 
demand among those purchasing. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses risk among pastoralists in 
northern Kenya and the motivation for and design of the IBLI product offered to them. Section 3 develops 
a stylized model of livestock ownership and the role of insurance so as to understand the structural 
determinants of demand. Section 4 presents the research design and data, followed by an explanation and 
summary of key variables in Section 5. Section 6 describes the econometric strategy used to analyze demand 
for IBLI. The results are discussed in Section 7. 
II. Drought-Related Livestock Mortality & Index Insurance in Kenya  
A first order concern in the design of an optimal insurance index is that it significantly reduces risk borne 
by the target population and that the index covaries strongly with observed losses. The IBLI product 
expressly covers predicted area average livestock mortality that arises due to severe forage shortages 
associated with drought, precisely because drought-related livestock mortality has consistently emerged as 
the greatest risk faced by pastoralists in the arid and semi-arid lands (ASAL) of the Horn of Africa (McPeak 
& Barrett 2001; McPeak, Little & Doss 2012, Barrett & Santos 2014).  
Livestock not only represent the principal source of income across most ASAL households (mean=69% 
and median=95% in our data) but also constitute the highest value productive asset they own. Livestock 
face considerable mortality risk, rendering ASAL households particularly vulnerable to herd mortality 
shocks. Among these, drought is by far the greatest cause of mortality, and drought-related deaths largely 
occur in times of severe forage shortages. For example, between June 2000 and June 2002, surveyed 
pastoralists reported that drought-related factors accounted for 53% of the livestock deaths that they 
experienced, and disease, which is often associated with droughts, caused an additional 30% mortality 
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during that period (McPeak, Little & Doss 2012). Drought is the cause of 62% of the reported livestock 
mortality in our 2009-12 sample from northern Kenya. Droughts represent a covariate risk that may be 
especially difficult for existing social risk pooling schemes to handle because losses can impact all members 
of the risk pool. Thus, the seemingly largely covariate risk profile pastoralists face seems well-suited for 
coverage by an index product. 
Launched as a commercial pilot in January 2010 in the arid and semi-arid Marsabit District to address 
the challenge of drought-related livestock mortality, the index based livestock insurance (IBLI) product is 
derived from the Normalized Difference Vegetation Index (NDVI), an indicator of photosynthetic activity 
in observed vegetation as reflected in spectral data remotely sensed from satellite platforms at high 
spatiotemporal resolution (Chantarat et al. 2013). These NDVI data are reliably and cheaply accessible in 
near real-time, and with a sufficiently long historical record to allow for accurate pricing of the IBLI product 
(Chantarat et al. 2013). The statistical relationship between NDVI and livestock mortality was estimated 
using historic household level livestock mortality rates and NDVI values from January 2000 through 
January 2008 and then tested out-of-sample against a different set of seasonal household panel data 
collected 2000-2 in the same region.2 The resulting response function generates estimates of division 
average livestock mortality rate.3 IBLI appears to be the only index insurance product currently on the 
market that was developed using longitudinal household data so as to minimize the design component of 
basis risk.4  
A commercial underwriter offers IBLI contracts written on this predicted livestock mortality rate index 
(see Chantarat et al. 2013 for more details on data and product design). The index is calculated separately 
for each of the five administrative divisions in Marsabit, allowing for variation between divisions.  The 
commercial underwriter set a single strike level—the index level above which indemnity payments are 
made—at 15% predicted livestock mortality and aggregated the five index divisions into two premium 
regions.  Notably, the aggregation of index divisions into premium regions results in variation in 
loadings/subsidies between index divisions, opening the door for spatial adverse selection.5  A detailed 
summary of the contract parameters (e.g., geographical segmentation of coverage, temporal coverage of 
                                                   
2  Monthly household-level livestock mortality data were collected by the Arid Lands Resource Management Project (ALRMP, 
http://www.aridland.go.ke/). The seasonal household panel data used for out-of-sample evaluation come from the Pastoral Risk Management project 
(http://dyson.cornell.edu/special_programs/AFSNRM/Parima/projectdata.htm).  
3 
“Divisions” are existing administrative units in Kenya that define the geographic boundaries of the IBLI contract. Division boundaries are 
suitable because they are large enough to reduce moral hazard to a negligible level, small enough to capture a large portion of covariate risk, and 
are well known by pastoralists.  
4
 An index based livestock insurance program in Mongolia, which protects pastoralists from the risk of severe winters known as dzud, seems to 
have been designed off area average herd mortality rates (see Mahul & Skees 2007 for a full description of the IBLI Mongolia project). As of 
writing, the Mongolian program has yet to make its findings public so we are unable to use the similarities between programs to inform this research. 
5
 The aggregation of index divisions into premium regions had been dropped in the newer IBLI products introduced in 2013. 
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the contract, conditions for contract activation, indemnification schedule, pricing structure) is presented in 
Appendix A. 
During the first sales season in January 2010, 1,974 policies were sold covering the long rain/long dry 
season of 2010 (LRLD10) and following short rain/short dry season (SRSD10), from March 1, 2010-
Ferburary 28, 2011. The intention was to have a sales window during the two-month period before the onset 
of each bimodal rainy season. Due to logistical and contractual complications, IBLI was not available for 
purchase during the August/September 2010 or January/February 2012 periods. In total, there have been 
four sales windows and six seasons of coverage during the timeframe considered in this paper. Table 1 
presents summary statistics for IBLI sales over the four rounds that fall within our sample period.  
There was a consistent fall in IBLI uptake over the 2010-2012 period. Although inconsistency of sales 
windows, a change in the commercial insurance provider, and variation in extension and sales protocols 
may have depressed sales, heterogeneity in demand suggests that other factors also influenced purchases. 
Tracking household purchase patterns across seasons shows considerable variation in when households 
make their first purchase, if they continue to purchase, or if they allow their contract to lapse (Table 2). 
Such behavior suggests dynamic factors play a significant role in insurance demand. In the next section, 
we offer a simple model of index insurance demand and examine the role that basis risk and spatiotemporal 
adverse selection could play in determining demand. 
III. Demand for Index Based Livestock Insurance 
This section sets up a simple model of household demand for insurance that offers a set of empirically 
testable hypothesis concerning basis risk and spatiotemporal adverse selection. This is meant merely to 
motivate the empirical exploration that is this paper’s primary contribution. So we simplify this as a static 
problem under uncertainty and ignore dynamic considerations in the interests of brevity. 
Let households maximize their expected utility, which is an increasing and concave von Neumann-
Morgenstern function that satisfies U’>0, U’’<0. Utility is defined over wealth, measured as end-of-period 
herd size expressed in tropical livestock units (TLU). 6  Households have an initial livestock 
endowment,TLU0, but the herd is subject to stochastic losses (L). Households have the option of purchasing 
livestock insurance at the rate of 𝑝 per animal insured (𝑡𝑙?̃?) where 𝑡𝑙?̃? is in TLUs and 𝑝 ∈ [0,1].7 The 
                                                   
6 Tropical livestock units (TLUs) are a conversion rate used to aggregate livestock.  The IBLI contracts use the conversion rate of 1 TLU = 0.7 
camels = 1 cattle = 10 sheep or goats as suggested by the FAO Livestock and Environment Toolbox (1999). 
7
 The premium and index are defined as ratio to avoid the need to place a monetary value on livestock. This specification is appropriate in the 
context of livestock insurance in northern Kenya because households often sell off a small animal in order to purchase insurance on remaining 
animals. If the cost of insuring one animal was equivalent to the value of the animal, p=1. 
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insurance makes indemnity payments according to an index, which is the predicted rate of division average 
livestock losses (𝐼 ∈ [0,1]).8 The utility maximization problem and budget constraint can be described as 
follows, where E is the expectation operator; 
 
(1) max
𝑡𝑙?̃?
𝐸[𝑈(𝑇𝐿𝑈)] 
𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝑡𝑜: 𝑇𝐿𝑈 = 𝑇𝐿𝑈0 − 𝐿 − 𝑡𝑙?̃? ∗ 𝑝 + 𝑡𝑙?̃? ∗ 𝐼 
 
Normalize the variables 𝑇𝐿𝑈, 𝑇𝐿𝑈0 , 𝐿, 𝑡𝑙?̃? by 𝑇𝐿𝑈0 so that they are now all expressed as proportions of 
the household’s initial herd endowment. Substituting the budget constraint into the utility function and 
using a second order Taylor expansion allows us to approximate the expected utility maximization problem 
as a function of original livestock endowment and deviations from the endowment associated with losses, 
premium payments and indemnity payments.9 The necessary first order condition becomes 
 
(2) 𝐸 [𝑈′(𝑇𝐿𝑈0)(−𝑝 + 𝐼) + 𝑈
′′(𝑇𝐿𝑈0)[𝐿𝑝 − 𝐿 ∗ 𝐼 + 𝑡𝑙?̃? ∗ 𝑝
2 − 2𝑝 ∗ 𝐼 ∗ 𝑡𝑙?̃? + 𝑡𝑙?̃? ∗ 𝐼2]] = 0 
 
The first order condition can be solved for optimal insurance purchases. We use the representations 
𝐸[𝑥] = ?̅? , 𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑥, 𝑦)= the covariance of 𝑥  and  𝑦 , and 𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑥)  = variance of  𝑥 , where 𝑥  and 𝑦  are 
representative variables. In addition, we use U=U(TLU0) to simplify notation. With some algebra, the 
optimal number of animals to ensure can be written as equation (3). 
 
(3) 
𝑡𝑙?̃?∗ =
𝑈′′[?̅?(𝐼 ̅ − 𝑝) + 𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝐼, 𝐿)] − 𝑈′(𝐼 ̅ − 𝑝 )
𝑈′′((𝐼 ̅ − 𝑝)2 + 𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝐼))
 
 
If premiums are actuarially fairly priced, then the premium rate is equal to the expected index value (𝐼 ̅ =
𝑝). In that case, optimal coverage is 𝑡𝑙?̃?∗ =
𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝐼,𝐿)
𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝐼)
, which is greater than zero as long as the covariance 
between the index and losses is positive and equal to one if an individual’s losses are identical to the index. 
If the insurer adds loadings to the policy premium so that 𝐼 ̅ < 𝑝, then optimal insurance purchase volumes 
can be zero even when the index is positively correlated with household losses.  
                                                   
8 
The division refers to the geographic region defined by the insurance product.   
9
 max
𝑡𝑙?̃?
𝐸 [𝑈(𝑇𝐿𝑈0) + 𝑈
′(𝑇𝐿𝑈0)(−𝐿 − 𝑡𝑙?̃? ∗ 𝑝 + 𝑡𝑙?̃? ∗ 𝐼) +
1
2
𝑈′′(𝑇𝐿𝑈0)(−𝐿 − 𝑡𝑙?̃? ∗ 𝑝 + 𝑡𝑙?̃? ∗ 𝐼)
2
] 
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A. Basis risk 
If there is no basis risk (𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝐼, 𝐿) = 𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝐼)) and the premiums remain actually fair, then the index and 
losses are identical and 𝑡𝑙?̃?∗ = 1, i.e., full insurance is optimal. As the covariance between the index and 
individual losses falls, however, so does optimal coverage (
𝑑 𝑡𝑙?̃?∗
𝑑𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝐼,𝐿)
=
1
𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝐼)
> 0).  
To more closely examine the role that basis risk plays, let the index equal individual losses multiplied by 
a coefficient, a constant, and a random error term (𝐼 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐿 + 𝜀). The expected difference between the 
index and losses (expected basis error) is captured by the relationship 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐿, in particular deviations 
from the null 𝛽0 = 0 and 𝛽1 = 1, while 𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝜀) is the variance in basis error.  
Because the covariance between the error term and losses is zero by construction, optimal coverage for 
actuarially fairly priced index insurance with basis risk is 𝑡𝑙?̃?∗ =
𝛽1𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝐿)
𝛽1𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝐿)+𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝜀)
. Clearly, as the variance 
in basis error increases, demand falls. Alternatively, as 𝛽1 increases so does demand as long as there is 
some variance in basis error (𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝜀) ≠ 0).10 At actuarially fair premium rates with no variance in basis 
error, households can adjust their purchase levels to account for expected basis error at no change to 
expected net costs, and full coverage continues to be optimal. 
Relaxing the premium constraint, let premiums be set so that 𝑝 + 𝛿 = 𝐸[𝐼], where 𝛿 represents the net 
loading on the policy. Thus, if there is a net subsidy, 𝛿 > 0, while if the premiums are loaded beyond the 
subsidy, 𝛿 < 0. Optimal coverage is not monotonic in premium rates because changes to premium rates not 
only effect the opportunity cost of premium payments but also have wealth effects that are ambiguous in 
their impact on demand, 
𝜕𝑡𝑙?̃?∗
𝜕𝛿
=
{𝑈′′?̅?−𝑈′}
𝐷
−
2𝛿𝑈′′{𝑈′′[?̅?(𝛿)+𝛽1𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝐿)]−𝑈
′(𝛿 )}
𝐷2
. Clarke (2011) discusses a similar 
outcome.  
Adjusting the earlier model with basis risk to allow for variation in premium rates, optimal coverage is 
now  𝑡𝑙?̃?∗ =
𝑈′′[?̅?(𝛿)+𝛽1𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝐿)]−𝑈
′(𝛿 )
[𝑈′′((𝛿)2+𝛽1𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝐿)+𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝜀))]
 and demand still falls with increased variance in basis error.11 The 
importance of basis risk might also change with prices. Analytically, we find that demand response to basis 
risk changes with premium rates but is also subject to the ambiguous wealth effects; 
 
(4) 𝜕2𝑡𝑙?̃?∗
𝜕𝑝𝜕𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝜀)
=
𝑈′′(𝑈′ − 𝑈′′?̅?)
𝐷2
+
4𝑈′′
2
𝛿𝑁
𝐷3
≤ 0 
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𝑑𝑡𝑙?̃?
𝑑𝛽
=
𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝐿)∗𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝜀)
(𝛽1𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝐿)+𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝜀))
2 ≥ 0.  There is a discontinuity in demand where 𝛽1 = −
𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝜀)
𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝐿)
 but demand is increasing with  𝛽1 on either side of the 
discontinuity. 
11  
𝜕𝑡𝑙?̃?∗
𝜕𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝜀)
= −
𝑈′′{𝑈′′[?̅?(𝛿)+𝛽1𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝐿)]−𝑈
′(𝛿 )}
𝐷2
≤ 0 
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where 𝐷 = 𝑈′′[𝛿2 + 𝛽1𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝐿) + 𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝜀)] and 𝑁 = 𝑈
′′[𝐿𝛿 + 𝛽1𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝐿)] − 𝑈′𝛿. This leads to 
 
Hypothesis 1: As basis risk grows, demand falls, and that response changes with premium levels. 
 
We also expect that the impact of the premium changes with basis risk in the same direction as 
𝜕2𝑡𝑙?̃?∗
𝜕𝑝𝜕𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝜀)
 
due to symmetry of cross partials in the Hessian matrix. This is consistent with Karlan et al.’s (2014) finding 
that households were less responsive to price incentives in regions with low product quality (high design 
error).  
In some cases it may be that households do not understand the insurance product well. For example, a 
household might think that the insurance product indemnifies all losses or that indemnity payments are 
always made at the end of every season. In either of these cases, basis risk should play no role in the 
purchase decision, although it could have a large impact on the eventual welfare outcomes of the purchase 
decision. Between those two extremes, there may be households that partially understand the insurance 
contract but have some misconceptions.  
Let an individual’s understanding of the product be summarized by the term (𝐼𝑖 = 𝐼 + 𝑧𝑖 ) where 𝐼 
continues to the index that determines indemnity payments, 𝑧𝑖reflects the individual’s misinformation and 
𝐼𝑖 is the index required to produce the indemnity payment that the individual expects to receive. Assuming 
actuarially fair premium rates, the optimal purchase is 𝑡𝑙?̃?∗ =
𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝐼,𝐿)+𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑧,𝐿)
𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝐼)+𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑧)+2∗𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝐼,𝑧)
. If the misconceptions 
are negatively and highly correlated with the index, the consumer’s optimal purchases could increase with 
increased basis risk.12 Otherwise, households with misconceptions reduce optimal purchases with increased 
basis risk but that response is mitigated by basis risk.13 This relationship leads to our next hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 2: Poor understanding of the product moderates the negative demand response to increases in 
basis risk. At the most extreme levels of misinterpretation of the contracts, households may not respond at 
all to basis risk or might increase demand with basis risk.  
B. Spatiotemporal Adverse Selection 
Indemnifying covariate losses, rather than individual losses, eliminates the prospective impact on insurer 
profits of within index-division cross-sectional adverse selection by decoupling indemnity payments from 
                                                   
12 
𝑑 𝑡𝑙?̃?∗
𝑑𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝐼𝑖,𝐿)
=
1
𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝐼)+𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑧)+2∗𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝐼,𝑧)
< 0 if 𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝐼) + 𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑧) + 2 ∗ 𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝐼, 𝑧) < 0 
13  
𝑑 𝑡𝑙?̃?∗
𝑑𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝐼𝑖,𝐿)
<
𝑑 𝑡𝑙?̃?∗
𝑑𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝐼,𝐿)
 if 𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑧) + 2 ∗ 𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝐼, 𝑧) > 0 
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individual losses.14 But group-level adverse selection can reemerge if households have information on the 
likelihood of an indemnity payment in the coming season that is not reflected in the premium. For example, 
ecological conditions during the sales window may have predictive power as to the likelihood of an 
upcoming drought. In this case, the consumer has a signal (observed ecological conditions) that provides 
information on the distribution of coming average losses and thus the likelihood of indemnity payments, 
and that information was not incorporated in the product’s pricing. Even in cases when the insurer can 
observe the same information that households can, contracts are not always written with variable premium 
rates. Rather, insurers and reinsurers often set prices according to historic averages and are commonly 
reluctant to change premiums season by season. 
Such intertemporal adverse selection can be incorporated into the above model. Assume that before 
purchasing insurance a household observes a signal that provides information on the likelihood of certain 
end-of-season rangeland conditions that could affect the index for this specific season (𝐸[I∗]) and/or the 
mortality rate at the end of this season (𝐸[𝐿∗]). Let 𝑥∗ be the household’s interpretation of the signal as an 
adjustment to the index 𝐸[𝐼∗] = 𝐸[𝐼] + 𝑥∗  and 𝑦∗be the household’s interpretation of the signal as an 
adjustment to her own expected livestock mortality rate (𝐸[𝐿∗] = 𝐸[𝐿] + 𝑦∗) where 𝑥∗, 𝑦∗ ∈ [−1,1]. We 
can then rewrite 3 as  
 
(3‘) 
𝑡𝑙?̃? =
𝑈′′[(?̅? + 𝑦∗)(𝐼 ̅ + 𝑥∗ − 𝑝) + 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝐼, 𝐿)] − 𝑈′(𝐼 ̅ + 𝑥∗ − 𝑝 )
[𝑈′′((𝐼 ̅ + 𝑥∗ − 𝑝)2 + 𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝐼))]
 
 
If the signal pertains only to individual losses (𝑥∗ = 0), then 
𝑑𝑡𝑙?̃?
𝑑𝑦∗
=
𝐼−̅𝑝
((𝐼−̅𝑝)2+𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝐼))
, which has the same 
sign as 𝐼 ̅ − 𝑝 and is identical to a change in long-run livestock losses (?̅?). Households that believe they will 
lose livestock at a greater rate in the following season will increase purchases if premiums are subsidized 
and reduce purchases if premiums are loaded. This leads directly to our third core, testable hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 3: Households will respond to signals of increased losses by increasing purchases if premiums 
are below the actuarially fair rate.  
 
By contrast, if the signal pertains only to the expected index, the outcome is similar to changes in 
loadings/subsidies and is not monotonically increasing or decreasing in 𝑥∗ . 15  But, just as with the 
                                                   
14 For the same reasons, index insurance reduces the incentives for moral hazard. 
15 𝜕𝑡𝑙?̃?
∗
𝜕 𝑥∗
=
{𝑈′′?̅?−𝑈′}
𝑈′′((𝐼̅+𝑥∗−𝑝)2+𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝐼))
−
2(𝐼̅+𝑥∗−𝑝)𝑈′′{𝑈′′[(?̅?+𝑦∗)(𝐼̅+𝑥∗−𝑝)+𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝐼,𝐿)]−𝑈′(𝐼+̅𝑥∗−𝑝 )}
[𝑈′′((𝐼̅+𝑥∗−𝑝)2+𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝐼))]
2  
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ambiguous impact of premium rates on optimal purchases, we can learn about the impact of 𝑥∗ through its 
impact on 
𝑑𝑡𝑙?̃?
𝑑𝑦∗
. The cross partial, 
𝜕2𝑡𝑙?̃?∗
𝜕 𝑥∗𝜕 𝑦∗
=
𝑈′′2[𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝐼)−(𝐼+̅𝑥−𝑝)2]
[𝑈′′((𝐼+̅𝑥∗−𝑝)2+𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝐼))]
2, inherits its sign from 𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝐼) − (𝐼 ̅ +
𝑥 − 𝑝)2. If, for example, 𝐼 ̅ = 𝑝 and the household receives a signal of increased losses and higher index, 
then 
𝑑𝑡𝑙?̃?
𝑑𝑦∗
> 0 and 
𝑑𝑡𝑙?̃?
𝑑𝑦∗
 increases with 𝑥∗ until 𝑥∗2 = 𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝐼) and then 
𝜕2𝑡𝑙?̃?∗
𝜕 𝑥∗𝜕 𝑦∗
≤ 0. As with the effects of 
premiums on demand, the impact of signals that inform on both losses and index levels is an empirical 
question. If those signals correctly predict coming conditions, such behavior will be evident in a correlation 
between demand and index value.  
A related, spatially defined form of group-level adverse selection can occur when index performance or 
the difference between the expected index value and the premium varies between distinct geographic 
regions.16 Differences between expected indemnity payments and the premium are likely to be common for 
products with little data with which to estimate the expected indemnity payment. It is, in essence, variance 
in subsidy/loading rates between divisions caused by error in the provider’s estimated expected index values 
or perhaps intentionally (e.g., variation in state subsidy rates). This type of spatial adverse selection is 
covered in the above examination of the effects of varying the subsidy/loadings.  
A second type of spatial adverse selection can occur if there is variation in the basis risk between index 
regions. That is, there may be very little basis risk in one division and a great deal in another even as 
subsidy/loading rates are similar. As was shown above, regions with higher basis risk are expected to have 
less demand, all else being equal. This generates our fourth core hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 4: Division-level variation in basis risk will cause spatial adverse selection apparent in uptake 
patterns.  
 
This simple, static model conforms to our expectations of reduced demand with increased basis risk. It 
predicts that basis risk will be less important for those who do not understand the product well, and that as 
basis risk increases, price responsiveness will change. In addition, the model is easily extended to include 
factors that may contribute to spatiotemporal adverse selection. It predicts that we should expect to see 
variation in demand within divisions over time that is correlated with rangeland conditions during the sales 
windows and among divisions based on spatial average differences in basis risk.  The important point of 
the model and these analytic findings is that the design features of an index insurance product may 
                                                   
16 
Within geographic regions there may be clusters of households for whom the index performs especially well or poorly.  Although the resulting 
variation in demand would likely have a geographic component, the within-division demand patterns have no impact on provider’s profits and thus 
is not adverse selection.   
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significantly attenuate demand irrespective of the household characteristics extensively studied in the 
literature to date.  
IV. Research Design & Data 
Before any public awareness campaign began surrounding the January 2010 launch of the IBLI pilot, the 
IBLI research team began to implement a comprehensive household survey that annually tracks key 
parameters of interest such as herd dynamics, incomes, assets, market and credit access, risk experience 
and behavior, demographics, health and educational outcomes, and more. The initial baseline survey was 
conducted in October of 2009, with households revisited annually thereafter in the same October-November 
period. A total of 924 households were sampled across 16 sub-locations in four divisions (Central, Laisamis, 
Loiyangalani and Maikona)   of Marsabit District, selected to represent a broad variation of livestock 
production systems, agro-ecology, market accessibility and ethnic composition.17 The codebook and data 
are publically available at http://livestockinsurance.wordpress.com/publications/. 
A few key elements of the survey design are important to note. Two randomized encouragement 
treatments were implemented to help identify and test key program parameters on demand. In the first, a 
sub-sample was selected to play a comprehensive educational game based on the pastoral production system 
and focused on how IBLI functions in the face of idiosyncratic and covariate shocks. The game was played 
in nine of the 16 sites among a random selection of half of the sample households in each selected site, and 
took place just before the launch of sales in January 2010 (McPeak, Chantarat & Mude 2010). 
The second encouragement treatment involved a price incentive that introduced exogenous variation in 
premium rates. Discount coupons were randomly distributed to about 60% of the sample before each sales 
season. The coupons were evenly distributed among 10%, 20%, 30%, 40%, 50% and 60% discount levels. 
Upon presentation to insurance sales agents, the coupon entitled the household to the relevant discount on 
premiums for the first 15 TLU insured during that marketing season.18 The coupons expired after the sales 
period immediately following their distribution. Each sales period has a new randomization of discount 
coupons. 
The IBLI team also coordinated survey sites to overlap with the Hunger Safety Net Program (HSNP), a 
new cash transfer program launched by the Government of Kenya in April 2009 that provides regular 
monthly cash transfers to a select group of target households in the northern Kenya ASAL (Hurrell & 
Sabates-Wheeler 2013). The regularity and certainty of this cash transfer may impact household liquidity 
                                                   
17 This sample was distributed across the 16 sub-locations on the basis of proportional allocation using the Kenya 1999 household population 
census statistics. There were only two exceptions to this rule: a minimum sample size of 30 households and maximum of 100 hou seholds per sub-
location. In addition, sampling across each sub-location was also stratified by wealth class based on livestock holdings reported by key informants 
before the selection process.  
18 Of the nine sample households that purchased insurance for more than 15 TLUs, six used a discount coupon for the first 15TLUs. 
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constraints and therefore demand for IBLI. Site selection for IBLI extension encouragement was stratified 
to include both communities targeted by HSNP and other, nearby communities that were not. Figure 1 
displays the project’s sample sub-locations across Marsabit and illustrates how they vary in terms of the 
noted elements of the study design. Discount coupons were randomly distributed without stratification. 
This paper uses data from four annual survey rounds from between 2009 to 2012. The attrition rate during 
this period was less than 4% in each round. An analysis of attrition is found in Appendix B. There are a 
number of differences between those households who remained in the survey and those who attrited (Table 
B4), as well as between those who exited the survey and their replacements (Table B5). For a discussion of 
the causes of attrition see ILRI (2012). We control for these characteristics in our analysis to mitigate 
prospective attrition bias introduced by this possible selection process, but the rate of exit is low enough 
and differences small enough that attrition should be of little worry. 
It is important to note that analysis of demand is performed seasonally while the survey data were 
collected annually. Although seasonal data were collected for many variables through recall, some 
characteristics were collected for only one reference point annually. In those cases, the annual values 
collected in October/November are used to represent household characteristics during the March-
September LRLD insurance season and the current October-February SRSD season. When estimating an 
average or distribution parameter (e.g., variance, covariance) all eight seasonal observations are used to 
estimate a single statistic, which is then treated as a constant over all periods. These details are described 
in more detail in the following section. 
V. Discussion of Key Variables  
IBLI purchases among those surveyed and within the general population across the Marsabit region were 
greatest in the first sales window and declined in the following periods (Table 1).19 About 45% of the 
balanced panel (N=832) purchased IBLI coverage at least once during the four sales periods covered in 
these data, a relatively high rate of uptake when compared against other index insurance pilots in the 
developing world. Conditional on purchasing an IBLI policy, the mean coverage purchased among the same 
sample was 3.15 TLUs or 24% of the average herd size during the sales windows. Table 2 details the 
frequencies of observed transitions between purchased coverage, existing coverage, and lapsed coverage. 
Figure 2 illustrates the proportion of the sample that purchased IBLI during each sales window and the level 
of purchase, conditional on purchasing.  
                                                   
19 It is important to note that IBLI was not available for purchase during the short rain/short dry (SRSD) 2010 or long rain/long dry (LRLD) 
2012 seasons due to logistical failures in the commercial supply channel. 
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Although existing research, which we discuss in detail below, has already provided a framework by 
which to understand many of the household-level factors the influence index insurance demand, we are in 
the unique position to empirically examine the role of basis risk and spatiotemporal adverse selection. Both 
are thought to impact demand but have not yet been tested using observations of household losses. At the 
same time, we reinforce previous findings in the literature by including factors that have been found to 
influence demand elsewhere. This section discusses the key variables used in the analysis.  
A. Basis Risk 
Low uptake is often thought to be due to basis risk, although no studies to date have had a direct measure 
of basis risk with which to test that hypothesis. Here it becomes useful to decompose basis risk into its 
design and idiosyncratic components. Design risk arises due to differences between predicted and actual 
division-average livestock mortality and can be corrected by adjusting the index. Idiosyncratic risk is due 
to differences between the covariate and individual losses and is intrinsically uncorrectable in the index.20 
One might think of design risk as an indicator of contract adherence, so far as it is the result of a deviation 
between the intended and actual coverage provided by a policy. But, households are unlikely to have 
information about the accuracy (or inaccuracy) of an index before product introduction. In cases where 
index products are new, such as in the Marsabit IBLI pilot we study, individuals must learn about design 
risk as index performance is revealed through observations of published index values (Karlan et al. 2014).  
We use the difference between the index and covariate losses during seasons that IBLI coverage was 
available and index values were publicized to generate our estimates of perceived or observed design risk.  
These estimates are a lagged moving average of within-division design error during preceding seasons in 
which IBLI coverage was available. We assume households expect no design error in the first sales round, 
which is reasonable in this context considering that extension and education focused on the likelihood of 
idiosyncratic risk but did not discuss design risk at all. After the first round, households discard their initial 
naive expectation and update so that their posterior is the average observed design error. They continue to 
do so in each of the following rounds. Table 3 reflects the observed design error estimates as well as the 
seasons used to make each estimate.  
Price surely matters to insurance uptake (Cole et al. 2013, Giné, Townsend & Vickery 2008, Karlan et 
al. 2014). The effective premium rate is calculated as the natural log of the premium rate after accounting 
for randomly distributed discount coupons. The effective premium rate is also interacted with observed 
                                                   
20 We did not distinguish between design and idiosyncratic risk in Section 3 because their combined effect determines the level of risk that an 
insured individual retains. Because design risk can be corrected through index modification while idiosyncratic risk cannot, this decomposition is 
nonetheless useful.   
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design error to test Hypothesis 1 that the price elasticity of demand changes with basis risk and to estimate 
the sign of that change. 
Although households initially have very little information on index accuracy, they are likely to already 
be quite familiar with their own historical losses and how those losses relate to the average losses within 
their division — i.e., their idiosyncratic risk. Households that systematically face high losses that are 
unrelated to covariate losses are less likely to benefit from even an accurate (i.e., no design error) index 
product. The variance in livestock mortality rate is a measure of the insurable risk that a households faces. 
The correlation between individual and covariate losses offers a measure of the how well covariate risk 
matches household risk, providing an indication of the amount of coverage that an index insurance product 
with zero design error could provide. A household with a correlation of one could be fully covered by an 
area average loss index insurance product like IBLI. As correlations fall from one, idiosyncratic risk 
increases and index insurable risk falls.  
Figure 3 displays histograms of the estimated correlation between individual losses and covariate losses 
in each division. There is clearly a great deal of variation within and between divisions in the individual-
covariate loss correlation. Indeed, 15.4% of households have a non-positive correlation, implying that even 
if IBLI suffered from zero design risk, it would be risk-increasing for them despite its insurance label.  
In order to accurately incorporate knowledge of idiosyncratic risk into their purchase decision, 
households must also understand that the IBLI contract is meant to insure only covariate risk. Without that 
understanding, households might not link purchases with their level of idiosyncratic risk. Ideally an estimate 
of idiosyncratic risk could be interacted with household understanding of IBLI. Although the IBLI survey 
does include a simple test of accuracy of IBLI knowledge, that evaluation could not be collected before the 
first sales period and is likely endogenous to the decision to purchase an IBLI policy.  
As a proxy for IBLI knowledge, we include a dummy for participation in the randomized education game 
described in the research design section. Participation in the game had a strongly positive and significant 
impact on performance on the IBLI knowledge test (Table 4). There is some prospect that game 
participation leads to purchasing through a mechanism other than knowledge (e.g., trust, a sense of 
obligation) so that the above test reported in Table 4 captures an increase in knowledge due to purchase 
rather than due to the educational component of the game. This is tested by restricting the analysis to only 
those households who never purchase IBLI. As reflected in the second row of Table 4, among those who 
never purchase IBLI, participation in the game increased average IBLI knowledge test scores by nearly 36% 
(p-value<0.01), providing strong evidence that randomized participation in the extension game directly 
leads to greater IBLI knowledge. The indicator variable for exogenous game participation is therefore 
interacted with the idiosyncratic risk estimate in order to test Hypothesis 2 that greater understanding of the 
IBLI contracts impacts consumer response to basis risk.  
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B. Spatiotemporal Adverse Selection 
IBLI is susceptible to intertemporal adverse selection because droughts leading to high livestock 
mortality are often the result of multiple seasons with poor precipitation so that households may wait until 
conditions are very poor before purchasing insurance. We include two variables—Pre-Czndvi and the 
household’s expectation of rangeland conditions in the coming season—to capture ecological conditions 
that pastoralists may observe while making their purchase decision 
Pre-Czndvi is a variable used in the IBLI response function to control for conditions at the beginning of 
the season and is calculated by summing standardized NDVI values from the beginning of the previous 
rainy season until the current sales period. Higher Pre-Czndvi values indicate greater relative greenness 
during the rainy season leading up to the current insurance season. Although the index takes Pre-Czndvi 
into account when estimating livestock mortality and premiums could be adjusted to reflect the level of risk 
at the beginning of a season, the insurer and reinsurer have chosen not to vary premium rates to account for 
this observed intertemporal variation in livestock mortality risk. Pre-Czndvi has a statistically significant 
and negative relationship with predicted livestock mortality rates (column 1, Table 5). Thus, if households 
observe the relative greenness that is captured by Pre-Czndvi, they could use those observations to help 
predict coming index values and adjust their purchase decisions accordingly. 
A set of dummy variables specify the household’s stated expectations for the coming season’s rangeland 
conditions: good, normal, or bad. Expectation of good or normal rangeland conditions are negatively and 
statistically significantly correlated with end-of-season index values (predicted livestock mortality rates) as 
is expected if they correctly predicted coming rangeland conditions (column 2, Table 5). Hypothesis 3 
predicts that as long as premium rates are below the expected indemnity rate, households expecting higher 
livestock mortality rates will increase purchases but is ambiguous about the impact of that expectation if it 
also suggests higher index values.21  
Households’ expectations of rangeland conditions may contain information that is captured by the Pre-
Czndvi variable or the households may be observing additional information that is not captured by the 
remotely sensed NDVI. Regressing predicted livestock mortality onto both Pre-Czndvi and households’ 
expectations of coming conditions provides strong evidence that the households have additional 
information that is not captured by Pre-Czndvi.  The implication is the although IBLI providers could reduce 
the potential for intertemporal adverse selection associated with initial rangeland conditions by adjusting 
premium rates according to Pre-Czndvi, they would continue to face risk of intertemporal adverse selection 
arising from accurate private information held by their potential consumers.  
                                                   
21  The effective seasonal subsidies (E[indemnity payment rate]-seasonal premium rate) for the periods examined here are as follows: 
Central/Gadamoji 0.0249, Laisamis 0.0171, Loiyangalgani 0.0148, and Maikona 0.017 
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We also test for spatially defined adverse selection, which could emerge due to variation in the 
subsidy/loading rate in policies or variation in the quality of the policies. Variation in subsidy/loading rate 
results from the aggregation of index divisions into larger premium regions so that lower risk divisions are 
implicitly subsidizing the premium rates of higher risk division in the same premium region. Division-
average livestock mortality rate and risk (variance in livestock mortality rate) are used to capture division-
level differences in risk, and thus in actuarially fair premium rates of a perfect index product. Division 
average idiosyncratic risk (correlation between livestock mortality rate and covariate livestock mortality 
rate) provides an estimate of the average levels of basis risk and its importance relative to total risk within 
each division. Per Hypothesis 4 we expect higher levels of division average idiosyncratic risk to adversely 
affect IBLI uptake. 
C. Additional Key Variables 
Within the standard model of insurance, exposure to risk coupled with risk aversion is the fundamental 
reason for insurance demand. At any level of positive exposure to risk, the benefits of indemnified losses 
increase with level of risk aversion. But the impact of risk aversion on demand is somewhat ambiguous 
when market imperfections, such as basis risk or premium loadings, enter the picture. Most empirical 
studies of index insurance demand assume a monotonic relationship between risk aversion and demand, 
often finding that increased risk aversion is associated with decreased demand (i.e., Giné, Townsend & 
Vickery 2008; Cole et al. 2013). This negative correlation between risk aversion and demand for insurance 
has been interpreted as evidence that index insurance uptake in developing countries is more similar to 
technology experimentation/adoption than to neoclassical models of insurance demand. Hill, Robles, and 
Ceballos (2013) allow for a nonlinear relationship, specifically testing for hump-shaped demand across risk 
aversion as predicted by Clarke (2011), but find no significant difference in demand across the domain of 
observed risk aversion. In a setup similar to that used by Hill, Robles, and Ceballos (2013), we allow for a 
non-linear relationship between risk aversion and demand as predicted by (Clarke 2011). 
Whether households place more importance on absolute or relative risk is an empirical question that has 
not yet been addressed in the context of index insurance. To determine which is more important, we include 
total herd size and ratio of income generated from livestock and livestock related activities. Total herd size 
provides an absolute measure of exposure to asset risk associated with IBLI insurable assets, while the ratio 
of income that is generated from livestock and livestock related activities approximates the relative income 
risk associated with livestock mortality.  
Theory and empirical evidence are also ambiguous as to how wealth should affect demand for insurance 
when prices are actuarially unfavorable. Clarke (2011) shows that the relationship between wealth and 
demand is not monotonic for most reasonable utility functions in such environments. Empirical studies 
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offer contradictory evidence, finding that demand increases (Cole et al. 2013; Mobarak & Rosenzweig 2012) 
or decreases (McIntosh, Sarris, & Papadopoulos 2013) in variables associated with wealth. The empirical 
literature on poverty traps, which has been shown to exist among east African pastoralists (Lybbert et al. 
2004, Barrett et al. 2006, Santos and Barrett 2011), indicates that demand may be non-linear in wealth, 
changing dramatically across certain asset thresholds as households try to avoid or to break free of a low 
asset dynamic equilibrium (Chantarat et al. 2014; Janzen, Carter & Ikegami 2012; Lybbert, Just, & Barrett 
2013). We summarize household wealth with an asset index generated through factor analysis of an 
extensive list of household construction materials, productive assets excluding livestock, and other durables 
(Appendix B).  
Lack of liquidity is often found to constrain demand. Mobarak and Rosenzweig (2012) found that lack 
of cash was the primary reason given by Indian farmers for not purchasing an available index insurance 
product. Although liquidity is likely correlated with wealth, it can constrain demand at any wealth level 
(Cole et al. 2013). In order to capture liquidity, we calculate the sum of cash savings on hand or placed 
within any of several formal and informal savings arrangements. A household’s savings are liquid and 
provide a lower band estimate of access to liquid capital. We also include an estimate of monthly income 
and participation in the Hunger Safety Net Program (HSNP), an unconditional cash transfer program that 
was launched in the Marsabit region in 2009. 22 Although HSNP participation was not random within 
communities, we are able to cleanly identify the impact of transfers on demand by controlling for the known 
and corroborated household selection criteria and HSNP community selection.23  
Access to informal insurance schemes can be an important factor in demand for formal insurance. 
Mobarak and Rosenzweig (2012) show that informal risk pools that insure against idiosyncratic shocks 
complement index insurance with basis risk while informal schemes that protect against covariate shocks 
act as a substitute. In the pastoral societies of east Africa, informal risk sharing through livestock transfers 
and informal credit appears to be modest at best (Lybbert et al. 2004; Santos & Barrett 2011) and not timed 
so as to reduce the impact of shocks or to protect assets (McPeak 2006). But, because informal risk sharing 
is extremely relevant to this work and has empirically been found to impact demand for index insurance in 
                                                   
22 HSNP provides transfers every two months to eligible households for at least two years. The bimonthly transfers started at 2,150Ksh in 2009 
(about USD25) and increased to 3,000Ksh in 2011 and then increased again in 2012 to 3,500Ksh in order to help households cope  with a severe 
drought. 3,500Ksh could have purchased insurance for about 7 cattle in the lower Marsabit region at that time. There was no retargeting of or 
graduation from HSNP, which could have led to perverse incentives not to purchase IBLI if insurance has a beneficial impact on wealth. 
23
 For more details on the HSNP program logistics go to http://www.hsnp.or.ke/ while analysis of impacts can be found in Hurrell & Sabates-
Wheeler (2013) and Jensen, Barrett and Mude (2014b).  
 18 
 
India (Mobarak & Rosenzweig 2012), we include the number of informal groups that the household 
participates in as a coarse indicator of potential access to risk pooling.24  
Finally, we expect that existing coverage still in force could impact purchase decisions and so control for 
existing coverage in that period.25 
Appendix B describes how each variable is constructed and which are lagged to avoid capturing changes 
due to paying the premium or due to behavior responses to having IBLI coverage. Table B2 provides 
summary statistics, distinguishing between those households who never purchased IBLI over the four sales 
windows and those who purchased at least once. Differences in unconditional means between the two 
groups show that the groups are mostly similar except for in those variable directly associated with 
purchases. 
VI. Econometric strategy 
We seek to identify the factors that influence demand for IBLI. Insurance demand is best modeled as a 
two stage selection process. Propensity to purchase is first determined as the household decides whether or 
not to buy IBLI. Those households who choose to purchase then decide how much to buy. Let ℎ𝑖𝑡
∗  and 𝑦𝑖𝑡
∗  
be latent variables that describe the categorical desire to purchase insurance and the continuous, optimal 
level of purchase, respectively. If ℎ𝑖𝑡
∗ > 0 we observe the positive level of purchase 𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝑦𝑖𝑡
∗  , and if ℎ𝑖𝑡
∗ ≤
0, we observe 𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 0. We write the process as a function of time invariant individual characteristics (𝑐𝑖 , 𝑑𝑖) 
including a constant term, time varying individual and division characteristics (𝑥𝑖𝑡 , 𝑧𝑖𝑡), and error terms 
(𝑢𝑖𝑡 , 𝑣𝑖𝑡) as follows. 
 
(5) 𝑦𝑖𝑡
∗ = 𝑐𝑖
′𝜂 + 𝑥𝑖𝑡
′ 𝛽 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡  
 ℎ𝑖𝑡
∗ = 𝑑𝑖
′𝜂 + 𝑧𝑖𝑡
′ 𝛾 + 𝑣𝑖𝑡 
 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = {
0 𝑖𝑓 ℎ𝑖𝑡
∗ ≤ 0
𝑐𝑖
′𝜂 + 𝑥𝑖𝑡
′ 𝛽 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡 𝑖𝑓 ℎ𝑖𝑡
∗ > 0
} 
 
                                                   
24
 Although ethnic group is also likely to be important in determining access to informal insurance, collinearity between ethnicity and location 
makes that aspect difficult to examine while also examining other variables that are correlated with location, such as the expected subsidy level and 
HSNP participation.  
25 The IBLI contracts provide coverage for 12 months following the sales window in which they were purchased. If there had been sales 
windows before each semi-annual rainy season, it would be common for households to enter sales windows with existing coverage for the following 
season from the preceding season. Logistical problems faced by the insurer did not allow for consistent sales twice a year, but the survey does 
capture two consecutive sales seasons during which IBLI policies were sold. We use a dummy variable to indicate existing coverage.  If households 
with existing coverage reduced purchases due to their existing coverage, a continuous variable might be more appropriate. That does not seem to 
be the case.  Households with existing coverage are much more likely to purchase additional insurance than those without it (difference = 13.6%, 
t-statistic=4.265) but existing coverage does not impact level of purchase conditional on purchasing (difference = 0.22, t -statistic=0.387). 
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If the same process is used to determine the desire to purchase insurance and the level of purchase, then 
𝑦𝑖𝑡
∗ ≡ ℎ𝑖𝑡
∗  and the model reduces to Tobin’s (1958) model for censored data. In the case of IBLI (and for 
many other cases) there is reason to believe that the two processes may differ. For example, the probability 
of purchasing any IBLI coverage is likely correlated with the distance that the purchaser must travel to 
make the purchase. There is little reason to think that the same distance variable would affect the level of 
purchase. If demand is a two stage process but the two decisions are independent (conditional on observed 
covariates), each stage can be estimated separately and consistently using a double hurdle model (Cragg 
1971).  
In this context, the two decisions most likely fall somewhere between Tobin’s assumption that they are 
identical and Cragg’s assumption that they are independent. That is, 𝑢𝑖𝑡 and 𝑣𝑖𝑡are not identical but they 
are correlated so that both the single model and independent models result in biased estimates of  𝛽 . 
Heckman (1979) suggests that such bias is due to a missing variable that accounts for selection. To control 
for selection, Heckman proposed including the ratio of the predicted likelihood of selection to the 
cumulative probability of selection (the inverse Mills ratio). The inverse Mills ratio is estimated by first 
using a probit model to estimate Pr(𝑠𝑖𝑡 = 1|𝑑𝑖,𝑧𝑖𝑡) = Φ(𝑑𝑖,𝑧𝑖𝑡 , 𝜂, 𝛾), where 𝑠𝑖𝑡 = {
0 𝑖𝑓 ℎ𝑖𝑡
∗ ≤ 0
1 𝑖𝑓 ℎ𝑖𝑡
∗ > 0
}. The 
estimates are then used to calculate the inverse Mills ratio ?̂?𝑖𝑡 =
𝜙(𝑑𝑖,𝑧𝑖𝑡 ,?̂?,𝛾)
Φ(𝑑𝑖,𝑧𝑖𝑡 ,?̂?,𝛾)
 , where 𝜙(𝑑𝑖,𝑧𝑖𝑡 , ?̂?, 𝛾) is the 
normal density. 
Accounting for unobserved household level fixed effects is then a matter of applying panel data 
estimation methods to Heckman’s framework. For short panels, the standard fixed effects approaches suffer 
from the incidental parameters problem when applied to probit models.26 But, if the data generating process 
is best described by the fixed effects model, pooled and random effects models will also be biased. Greene 
(2004) compares the magnitude of the bias introduced by estimating pooled, random effects, and fixed 
effects probit parameters for data generated by a probit process with fixed effects. At T=3 and T=5, Greene 
finds the random effects estimates are the most biased, and that the bias associated with the pooled and 
fixed effects models are similar in magnitude. In addition, standard errors are likely to be underestimated 
in the fixed effect model. We include pooled estimates in this analysis, acknowledging their likely bias but 
appealing to Greene’s (2004) result that these are likely least bad estimates.  
As an alternative, we also follow a procedure developed by Wooldridge (1995), which builds off of earlier 
work by Mundlak (1978) and Chamberlain (1980), to allow for correlation between the fixed effects and a 
                                                   
26 Because the probit model is non-linear the parameters must be estimated using within household observations, of which we have a maximum 
of four.      
 20 
 
subset of within-household mean characteristics (?̅?𝑖
𝐹𝐸) but assume independence conditional on the mean. 
In addition the errors are assumed to be distributed normally. 
 
(6) 𝑐𝑖 = ?̅?𝑖
𝐹𝐸′𝛾1 + 𝑒𝑖𝑡
𝑐 , 𝑒𝑖𝑡
𝑐 |?̅?𝑖
𝐹𝐸~𝑁(0, 𝜎𝑒
2) 
 𝑑𝑖 = ?̅?𝑖
𝐹𝐸′𝛿1 + 𝑒𝑖𝑡
𝑑 , 𝑒𝑖𝑡
𝑑 |?̅?𝑖
𝐹𝐸~𝑁(0, 𝜎𝑒
2) 
 
?̅?𝑖
𝐹𝐸 =
1
𝑇
∑ 𝑥𝑖𝑡
𝐹𝐸
𝑇
, 𝑥𝑖𝑡
𝐹𝐸 ⊆ 𝑥𝑖𝑡 , 𝑧𝑖𝑡  
 
As with the Heckman selection process described above, a probit model is used to estimate the inverse 
Mills ratio, but in this case the estimate is a function of household average characteristics and period specific 
characteristics ?̂?𝑖𝑡 =
𝜙(?̅?𝑖
𝐹𝐸′ ,𝑧𝑖𝑡,?̂?1,?̂?,𝛾)
Φ(?̅?𝑖
𝐹𝐸′,𝑧𝑖𝑡 ,?̂?1,?̂?,𝛾)
. In order to add more flexibility, and thus accuracy, to the first stage 
estimations, the probit model is estimated separately for each period. 
 Within-household mean characteristics are estimated using all eight seasonal observations while 𝑠𝑖𝑡 and 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 are only estimated during the four seasons in which there were sales. For those variables that appear in 
our estimates twice, as a household mean and a period specific observation, we use the deviation from the 
mean as the period-specific observation to facilitate interpreting the estimates.  
We report the pooled and the conditionally independent fixed effects estimates, while relying primarily 
on the latter as the preferred estimates. If the data generating process does include unobserved individual 
effects that are correlated with our outcome variables and the covariates, our pooled estimates are likely to 
be biased but perform better than either random or fixed effects models (Greene 2004). The conditionally 
independent fixed effects should generate estimates that are at the very least, less biased than those from 
the pooled model.  
Both models are estimated using maximum likelihood. Although effective (discounted) price is included 
in both selection and demand equations, a dummy variable indicating that the household randomly received 
a discount coupon is included in the selection equation but is excluded from the demand equation. The 
discount coupon serves merely as a reminder of the product availability and thus should affect the 
dichotomous purchase decision but have no effect on the continuous choice of insurance coverage 
conditional on purchase once we control for the effective discounted price. Although there is no agreed 
upon exclusion test for selection models, we perform two exploratory tests that support the exclusionary 
restriction on the coupon dummy variable in the demand equation, as reported in Appendix C. 
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VII. Results and Discussion 
Wooldridge (1995) describes a test for selection that assumes conditionally independent fixed effects in 
the selection stage but relaxes the conditional assumption in the outcome stage. That test does not reject the 
null hypothesis of an independent second stage at the standard 10% level of statistical significance (F-
stat=2.06, p-value=0.1522), but is near enough to warrant caution.  Thus, we proceed as though demand 
for IBLI can only be understood by first examining the factors that determine who purchases IBLI and then 
what drives the levels of purchases conditional on purchasing.27 In the following discussion we focus on 
the estimates generated from the conditional fixed effects model while also reporting the pooled estimates. 
The average marginal effects (AME) estimates are provided in tables 8 and 10 while the regression 
coefficient estimates can be found in Appendix E.28  
A. Determinants of IBLI uptake 
The relationship between wealth, access to liquidity, investments in livestock, and uptake are predictably 
complicated (Table 8). Herd size and HSNP transfers are positively related to IBLI purchase while asset 
wealth is negatively related to purchases. Although these estimates may seem superficially contradictory, 
in the context of a new technology in a pastoral region they strike us as intuitive. Households with larger 
herds have the greater potential absolute gains from the IBLI product. Large herds also require mobility to 
maintain access to forage (Lybbert et al. 2004) and many of the larger assets included in the asset index 
(e.g., TV, tractor, plow) are likely to be less appropriate for mobile, livestock-dependent households for 
whom IBLI should be most valuable.   
There is weak evidence of intertemporal adverse selection and strong evidence of spatial adverse 
selection. Households in divisions with greater average livestock mortality rate, lower variation in that rate 
(risk), and less idiosyncratic risk (as captured by greater average correlation between losses and the index) 
are more likely to purchase IBLI. The negative relationship between idiosyncratic risk and uptake is 
consistent with Hypothesis 4 from our analytic model. The fact that greater variation in livestock losses is 
associated with reduced uptake requires a closer look at the data. One likely explanation is that there is 
greater idiosyncratic risk (and thus basis risk) in divisions with more variation in losses. We test for a 
positive correlation between division average variance in livestock mortality rate and division average 
                                                   
27
 Analysis of uptake and level of purchase separately provides estimates that are very similar to those described in this paper.  Importantly, our 
findings concerning the importance of basis risk and adverse selection are the same.  
28
 The second stage of the conditional fixed effects model is estimated using inverse Mills ratios generated by estimating the first stage probit 
model separately for each period.  In Tables 8 and E.1, we present the average coefficient estimates generated by pooling the four periods, including 
both time specific and household average characteristics. 
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idiosyncratic risk, and find that the correlation is indeed positive and significant (rho=0.98, p-value=0.004, 
N=4).  
Observed design error has a significant and negative AME on uptake, consistent with Hypothesis 1. 
Although the estimated AME of price is statistically insignificant, the coefficient estimates (Table E.1) 
show that the interaction between price and observed design error is important. Examining the impact of 
design error across a range of observed IBLI prices reveals that AME of observed design error is negative 
and increases in both significance and magnitude as prices increase, consistent with Hypothesis from our 
analytic model (Table 9). The same test for price response at various levels of observed design error shows 
that at low levels of design error uptake does not respond strongly to prices, while at higher levels of design 
error price plays a much more significant role in determining uptake.  When observed design error is one 
standard deviation above the mean, the average effect of a one unit increase in prices is to reduce uptake 
by 7.9% (AME=-0.079, t-statistic=-1.68).  
Households with consistently high participation in social groups have a greater propensity to purchase 
IBLI (Table 8). Although participating in social groups could be endogenous to purchasing IBLI, we find 
that lagged participation in the pooled model (column 1, Table 8) and household’s average participation 
(including 3 seasons before the first sales season., column 3, Table 8) has a positive and significant impact 
on uptake. Plausible explanations for the positive relationship between social group participation and IBLI 
uptake include the complementarities between index insurance and informal idiosyncratic risk pooling 
described by Mobarak and Rosenzweig (2012) and learning through social networks (Cai, de Janvry & 
Sadoulet 2011).  
Randomized exposure to the IBLI educational game allows us to look more closely at the impact of 
learning. Here we see that increased IBLI knowledge associated with participating in the game has no 
discernible impact on the decision to purchase IBLI (Table 9), although we know it does have a strong 
impact on understanding of the IBLI product (Table 4). In that case, it seems less likely that the pathway 
by which participation in social groups impacts demand is through increased understanding of the product 
and the argument that social group linkages stimulate IBLI uptake due to complementarities with informal 
insurance is stronger.  
The discount coupon, which is excluded in the second stage, has an AME of +17% on the likelihood of 
purchasing insurance and is statistically significant at the one percent level. Quite apart from the price effect 
of the discount coupon, it seems to serve a useful role as a visible reminder to households of the availability 
of insurance. 
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B. Quantity of Insurance Purchased 
The continuous IBLI purchase decision reveals some of the same patterns evident in the decision to 
purchase (Table 10). Larger herds are again associated with increased demand. 29  But, among those 
purchasing, demand increases with greater asset wealth, greater income, and income diversification into 
non-livestock related activities (nearly all of which generates cash earnings). Jointly, these results provide 
strong evidence that demand is liquidity constrained among those seeking to purchase IBLI.30 Referring 
back to our model of household demand for insurance, we could not analytically sign many of the 
relationships between household financial characteristics and demand because of the ambiguity of the 
wealth effect on demand. Empirically we also find mixed responses, such as asset wealth reducing the 
likelihood of uptake but increasing coverage levels conditional on uptake, while livestock wealth is 
associated with increases in both uptake and conditional coverage levels. 
There is evidence of both inter-temporal and spatial adverse selection in IBLI purchases conditional on 
positive demand. For households that purchase insurance, the AME of expecting good rangeland conditions 
represents an 11.2% reduction in coverage from the mean coverage purchased.31 The coefficient estimate 
for Pre-Czndvi (a division level proxy for rangeland conditions at the time of sale) is also negative and 
statistically significant. Division level risk has a positive impact on level of purchase so that households in 
divisions with high average risk are less likely to purchase but buy more coverage, conditional on 
purchasing. In addition, those divisions with higher average livestock mortality rates are more likely to 
purchase IBLI, but purchase less coverage.  
The correlation between individual and covariate losses plays a role in determining level of demand, 
although its impact is somewhat obscured by interactions (Table E.2). Separating purchasers by game play, 
the estimated AME of the correlation between an individual’s losses and the covariate losses of their 
division is negative and significant for households who did not participate in the IBLI extension game 
(Table 11). Although this does not confirm Hypothesis 2 on the interaction between understanding the IBLI 
product and the impact of basis risk on demand, it does point to a grave misunderstanding of the product 
                                                   
29 The AME of herd size is positive but less than one, revealing that households with larger herds insure more animals but a smaller portion of 
their total herd.   
30 All household income was derived from livestock in about 53% of the household observations during sales season. During the same periods, 
47% of the households that purchased insurance generated all of their income from livestock in the period that they purchased . Non-livestock 
income sources captured in the survey are from sale of crops, salaried employment, pensions, casual labor, business, petty trading, gifts, and 
remittances. 
31 The AME of expecting good rangeland conditions is -0.2709 while the averse coverage purchased is 2.429 TLUs. 
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among those that did not received product education via the extension game. As discussed in Section 4, 
participation in the IBLI game was randomized and has a large and significant impact on understanding of 
the IBLI product (Table 4). Here we see that purchase levels among those with less understanding of the 
product are higher among those with less covariate (insurable) risk.32  
Price is a significant factor influencing demand conditional on uptake, but demand is rather price inelastic, 
with an AME -0.43, lower than any of the other estimates we find in the literature. Examining the impact 
of observed design error on the price elasticity of demand, we find that the elasticity of demand and 
statistical significance of premium rates increases at higher levels of observed design error (Table 11). But, 
there is no direct negative effect of design error on level of purchase even at high premium levels. Jensen, 
Barrett and Mude (2014a) shed some light on why households may not have responded to design risk 
directly; in most cases design risk is minor when compared to idiosyncratic risk. Hence our findings that 
demand is much more closely linked with indicators of adverse selection make perfect sense.  
A Shapley’s R2 decomposition sheds some light on which factors contribute most to explaining variation 
in IBLI uptake and level of purchase.  After grouping the covariates into several categories, we re-estimate 
the uptake and demand equations separately and decompose their goodness of fit measures using the user-
written STATA command shapely2 (Juárez 2014), which builds off earlier work by Kolenikov (2000) and 
theory by Shapley (1953) and Shorrocks (2013).33 The Shapley R2 decompositions reported in Appendix F 
should be interpreted as the ratio of the model’s goodness of fit (R2 or Pseudo R2) that can be attributed to 
each group of variables.  For both uptake and level of demand, the role of adverse selection and product 
related variables in explaining demand is larger than that of household characteristics (demographics and 
financial), providing strong evidence that product design and the nature of the insured risk are at least as 
important as household characteristics in driving index insurance uptake. The Shapley values indicate that 
the three variables associated with design risk and price are responsible for 21% of our goodness of fit 
measure for the uptake model, a considerable share considering that there are more than 25 other covariates 
and that the discount coupon accounts for 35% of the model’s fit.  The role of design risk and price falls by 
about 5 points when examining level of purchase, where spatial and temporal adverse selection become 
increasingly important.  Together the two groups of adverse selection variables account for 32% of the 
model’s goodness of fit for level of purchase.  The importance of idiosyncratic risk to the fit of the model 
is fairly low and consistent in both uptake (5.46%) and level of purchase (5.42%).   
                                                   
32 Household level risk is accounted for in the risk variable so that this effect is not due to level of covariate risk picking up the effects of total 
risk. In addition, very few households ever purchase coverage for more animals than they hold so that this is unlikely to be the result of households 
(mistakenly) over-insuring to make up for uninsured idiosyncratic risk.   
33
 The variable categories are demographic, financial, intertemporal adverse selection, spatial adverse selection, idiosyncratic risk and 
knowledge, design risk and price, other, and the instrumental variable. 
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C. Concluding Remarks 
The above analysis provides strong empirical evidence that in addition to price and household 
characteristics, index insurance product characteristics such as adverse selection and basis risk play 
economically and statistically significant roles in determining demand.  The point estimates from our 
analysis (Table E1 and E2) predict the changes in IBLI purchases over time rather well, showing a reduction 
in uptake after the first period and a small upturn in the final period (Figure 4).   
With the model estimates and Shapely values in mind, it is clear that both product and household 
characteristics play an important role in determining demand for index insurance. While little can be done 
to change household characteristics, it may be possible to improve contract design to lessen adverse 
selection and idiosyncratic risk.  For example, IBLI no longer aggregates index divisions into premium 
regions, removing one source of spatial adverse selection. Adjusting premium rates dynamically to account 
for initial season conditions is an additional step that could be taken to reduce adverse selection.  
Idiosyncratic risk limits the potential impact of even a perfect index product, but is in part a construct of 
the index division, which could be adjusted to increase the importance of covariate risk.  Finally, reducing 
design risk is likely to be relatively simple if household-level data are collected and used to improve the 
performance of the index. The evidence from the IBLI pilot in northern Kenya clearly underscore the 
importance of index insurance design to resulting demand patterns for these innovative financial 
instruments. 
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FIGURE 1. SURVEY DESIGN, PARTICIPATION IN IBLI GAME AND HSNP TARGET SITES  
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 2. IBLI PURCHASING BEHAVIOR DURING EACH SALES WINDOW 
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FIGURE 3. HISTOGRAMS OF THE CORRELATION BETWEEN INDIVIDUAL AND COVARIATE LIVESTOCK MORTALITY RATES 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
FIGURE 4. UNCONDITIONAL OBSERVED AND PREDICTED LIKELIHOOD OF PURCHASING IBLI (LEFT) AND LEVEL OF PURCHASES, CONDITIONAL ON 
BEING A PURCHASER (RIGHT) 
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TABLES 
TABLE 1. REPRESENTATION OF DEMAND FOR IBLI IN THE SURVEY SAMPLE  
     IBLI survey households 
Survey# Sales Window IBLI Coverage Period  Total Contracts Sold Did Not 
Purchase 
Purchased 
R1 (2009) - -  - - - 
- -  - - - 
R2 (2010) J-F 2010 LRLD10/SRSD10 (N) 1,974 679 245 
  (Mean) & 3.0 - (3.94) 
None - (N) - - - 
   (Mean) & - - - 
R3 (2011) J-f 2011 LRLD11/SRSD11 (N) 595 790 134 
  (Mean) & (2.1) - (3.05) 
A-S 2011  SRSD11/LRLD12 (N) 509 797 127 
   (Mean) & (1.6) - (2.39) 
R4 (2012) None - (N) - - - 
  (Mean) & - - - 
A-S 2012 SRSD12/LRLD13 (N) 216 844 80 
   (Mean) & (1.9) - (2.64) 
Notes: LRLD and SRSD refer to the long rain/long dry and short rain/short dry season respectively. There were no sales during the Aug/Sept 2010 
and Jan/Feb 2011 sales periods due to supply channel failures. Jan/Feb 2010, Jan/Feb 2011 & Aug/Sept 2011 were sold by UAP Insurance. Aug/Sept 
2012 was sold by APA Insurance. #Surveys were collected during October and November of each year. &Mean is the unweighted mean coverage 
purchased in TLUs, conditional on purchasing IBLI.   
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 2. HOUSEHOLD IBLI PURCHASE PATTERNS, BY SALES WINDOW 
Sales window New1 Replacement2 Augmenting3 Holding4 Reenter5 Lapsed6 Total7 
J-F 2010 225 0 0 0 0 0 225 
J-F 2011 67 60 0 0 0 165 292 
A-S 2011 66 0 31 96 21 144 358 
A-S 2012 19 25 0 0 33 300 377 
Notes: We use the balanced panel of 832 households in this table to track household purchase behavior over time. Therefore, columns do not sum 
to the totals reported in Table 1. 1First time purchasers. 2Replaced a policy about to expire. 3Purchased additional coverage that overlapped with 
existing coverage. 4No purchase but had existing coverage. 5Let policy lapse for at least one season but purchased this season. 6Past policies have 
lapsed and did not purchased additional coverage. 7Total number of households that have purchased to date.   
 33 
 
TABLE 3. THE AVERAGE OBSERVED DESIGN ERROR IN EACH DIVISION AT EACH SALES PERIOD 
Sales Seasons  Observed Average Estimated Design Error (%) 
Design Risk Observations Central/Gadamoji Laisamis Loiyangalani Maikona 
J-F 2010 - 0 0 0 0 
J-F 2010 LRLD 2010 4.50 11.73 10.22 3.34 
A-S 2011 LRLD 2010, SRSD 2010 7.20 11.07 12.90 5.22 
A-S 2012 LRLD 2010, SRSD 2010, LRLD 2011, SRSD11 2.07 1.24 7.45 1.91 
Notes: LRLD and SRSD refer to the long rain/long dry and short rain/short dry season respectively. The observed average estimated design error 
is the mean difference between covariate loss rate and the predicted loss rate (index) during previous seasons with potential IBLI coverage.  
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 4. THE IMPACT OF THE RANDOMIZED EXTENSION GAME ON UNDERSTANDING OF THE IBLI CONTRACTS 
 Not game participant Game participant   
IBLI Knowledge: Mean Std. Err. Mean Std. Err. Difference t-test 
Full Sample (N=832) 1.72 0.065 2.22 0.086 0.50 4.60*** 
Never Purchased (N=450) 1.50 0.085 2.05 0.123 0.54 3.63*** 
Notes: The game was played in January 2010. The scores above reflect the number of correct answers to survey questions testing household 
understanding of IBLI contract details. Significance is indicated by: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
  
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 5.RANGELAND CONDITIONS DURING EACH SALES WINDOW AS PREDICTORS OF FINAL INDEX VALUE  
Variable Index Index Index 
Pre-Czndvi -0.0067**  -0.0059*** 
 (0.0026)  [0.0001] 
Expected Rangeland Condition1:    
Good  -0.0790*** -0.0525*** 
  [0.0042] [0.0038] 
Normal  -0.0470*** -0.0387*** 
  [0.0040] [0.0037] 
District Fixed Effects:    
Laisamis -0.0399 -0.0015 -0.0291*** 
 (0.0698) [0.0019] [0.0014] 
Loiyangalani -0.0473 -0.0368*** -0.0424*** 
 (0.0692) [0.0016] [0.0011] 
Maikona -0.0114 -0.0026* -0.0134*** 
 (0.0694) [0.0016] [0.0011] 
    
Constant 0.1009* 0.1727*** 0.1365*** 
 (0.0502) [0.0031] [0.0029] 
    
Observations 16 3,696 3,669 
R-squared 0.3945 0.1167 0.3910 
Notes: Four seasons’ data for four divisions with Central & Gadamoji division dummy omitted. 1The expected conditions variables are the division-
season average of a set of dummy variables for expected conditions are: good, normal, or bad. Expected conditions=Bad is the omitted category. 
Standard errors in parentheses. Robust and clustered standard errors in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
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TABLE 6. AVERAGE MARGINAL EFFECTS (AME) ON IBLI UPTAKE, FROM PROBIT 
  Pooled Conditional FE 
VARIABLES Coefficient Std. Err. Coefficient Std. Err. 
Household Period-Specific Characteristics: 
Dependency Ratio -0.0922* (0.0536) 0.0121 (0.0888) 
Social Groups L 0.0270** (0.0105) -0.0004 (0.0118) 
Asset Index L -0.0683*** (0.0261) -0.0729** (0.0290) 
Ln(Income) L 0.0039 (0.0077) -0.0005 (0.0060) 
Ratio income livestock L -0.0667* (0.0341) -0.0335 (0.0331) 
TLU L 0.0002 (0.0010) 0.0019** (0.0010) 
Livestock Mortality Rate L 0.0033 (0.0378) 0.0289 (0.0386) 
Savings (10TLU) L -0.0358 (0.0345) -0.0481 (0.0402) 
HSNP L 0.0525** (0.0231) 0.0558** (0.0224) 
Household Average Characteristics:     
Dependency Ratio   -0.1434** (0.0583) 
Social Groups    0.0570*** (0.0176) 
Asset Index    -0.0089 (0.0204) 
Ln(Income)   0.0041 (0.0089) 
Ratio Income Livestock    -0.0207 (0.0454) 
TLU    -0.0010 (0.0007) 
Livestock Mortality Rate    -0.1084 (0.2105) 
Savings (10TLU)    -0.0840 (0.0690) 
Expected Rangelands: Good#   -0.0599 (0.0666) 
Expected Rangelands: Normal#   -0.0746 (0.0657) 
Prospective Adverse Selection:     
Expected conditions: Good# -0.0514** (0.0231) -0.0311 (0.0243) 
Expected conditions: Normal# -0.0219 (0.0218) 0.0007 (0.0225) 
Pre-CZNDVI -0.0010 (0.0014) -0.0009 (0.0013) 
Division Livestock Mortality 0.0570*** (0.0203) 0.0577*** (0.0198) 
Division Risk -0.0522** (0.0210) -0.0589*** (0.0207) 
Division Correlation 0.2814* (0.1636) 0.2964* (0.1671) 
Product Related Characteristics :     
Existing IBLI Coverage 0.0239 (0.0482) 0.0172 (0.0497) 
Risk -0.6914*** (0.2416) -0.3257 (0.3505) 
Correlation 0.0064 (0.0267) 0.0090 (0.0272) 
Extension Game 0.0043 (0.0220) 0.0104 (0.0215) 
Ln(price) -0.0234 (0.0473) -0.0289 (0.0437) 
Observed Design Error (ODE) -0.0080*** (0.0025) -0.0073*** (0.0025) 
Coupon Dummy 0.1779*** (0.0341) 0.1715*** (0.0304) 
     
Observations 3,292  3,292  
F-statistic 4.11  5.10  
P-value (model) 0.00  0.00  
Notes: Additional covariates not listed above include age, age2, average age (Conditional FE model), gender, education, level of risk aversion, 
HSNP Village and a constant. L Variable is lagged one period. #Omitted variable is Expected Conditions= poor. Robust and clustered standard 
errors in parenthesis. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.   
 
 
 
 
TABLE 9. AME OF THE INTERACTED VARIABLES ON THE LIKELIHOOD OF PURCHASING IBLI  
 AME Std. Err. t P>t Confidence Interval 
Price = Observed Design Error      
Mean-1 SD -0.003 0.003 -1.150 0.252 -0.009 0.002 
Mean Price -0.009 0.003 -3.540 0.000 -0.014 -0.004 
Mean +1SD -0.014 0.004 -3.770 0.000 -0.022 -0.007 
       
Observed Design Error= Price      
Mean-1 SD 0.048 0.052 0.930 0.353 -0.054 0.150 
Mean ODE -0.025 0.043 -0.580 0.565 -0.108 0.059 
Mean +1SD -0.079 0.047 -1.690 0.092 -0.171 0.013 
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TABLE 10. AVERAGE MARGINAL EFFECTS (AME) ON LEVEL OF PURCHASE, CONDITIONAL ON PURCHASE 
  Pooled Conditional FE 
VARIABLES Coefficient Std. Err. Coefficient Std. Err. 
Household Period-Specific Characteristics:    
Dependency Ratio -0.3643 (0.2270) -0.0773 (0.6169) 
Social Groups L 0.0400 (0.0464) -0.0082 (0.0487) 
Asset Index L 0.1514 (0.1021) 0.2329** (0.1019) 
Ln(Income) L 0.0230 (0.0319) 0.0419* (0.0240) 
Ratio Income Livestock L -0.3690*** (0.1289) -0.4424*** (0.1605) 
TLU L 0.0050 (0.0040) 0.0106** (0.0054) 
Livestock Mortality Rate L 0.0061 (0.1817) -0.0091 (0.1696) 
Savings (10TLU) L 0.1428 (0.1466) 0.2676 (0.1982) 
HSNP L -0.0684 (0.0932) -0.1545 (0.1076) 
Household Average Characteristics:     
Dependency Ratio   -0.4075* (0.2449) 
Social Groups    0.0998 (0.0681) 
Asset Index    0.1970** (0.0813) 
Ln(Income)   0.0189 (0.0330) 
Ratio Income Livestock    -0.0111 (0.1900) 
TLU    0.0004 (0.0049) 
Livestock Mortality Rate    0.0523 (0.7496) 
Savings (10TLU)    0.0861 (0.2566) 
Expected Rangelands: Good#   -0.6382*** (0.2469) 
Expected Rangelands: Normal#   -0.5968** (0.2455) 
Prospective Adverse Selection:     
Expected Conditions: Good# -0.3915*** (0.0869) -0.2709*** (0.0946) 
Expected Conditions: Normal# -0.3270*** (0.0933) -0.2118** (0.0842) 
Pre-CZNDVI -0.0037 (0.0047) -0.0100* (0.0056) 
Division Livestock Mortality -0.1804** (0.0829) -0.1865** (0.0767) 
Division Risk 0.1682* (0.0886) 0.2002** (0.0842) 
Division Correlation -0.7921 (0.8214) -0.9204 (0.7385) 
Product Related Characteristics :     
Existing IBLI Coverage -0.1203 (0.0979) -0.2114** (0.1037) 
Risk -1.1626 (1.0886) -0.0205 (1.3111) 
Correlation -0.1599* (0.0935) -0.1397 (0.1035) 
Extension Game 0.0156 (0.0686) 0.0267 (0.0707) 
Ln(Price) -0.4790*** (0.1214) -0.4275*** (0.1342) 
Observed Design Error (ODE) -0.0070 (0.0124) -0.0062 (0.0127) 
     
Observations 3,292  3,292  
F-statistic 4.11  5.10  
P-value (model) 0.00  0.00  
Notes: Additional covariates not listed above include age, age2, average age (Conditional FE model), gender, education, level of risk aversion, 
HSNP Village, the Inverse Mills ratio, and a constant. L Variable is lagged one period. # Omitted variable is Expected conditions=poor. Robust and 
clustered standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
 
 
 
 
TABLE 11. AME OF THE INTERACTED VARIABLES ON IBLI PURCHASE LEVEL, CONDITIONAL ON PURCHASING  
  AME Std. Err. t P>t Confidence Interval 
Observed Design Error= Price      
Mean-1 SD -0.393 0.191 -2.050 0.040 -0.768 -0.017 
Mean ODE -0.424 0.138 -3.070 0.002 -0.695 -0.153 
Mean +1SD -0.455 0.129 -3.520 0.000 -0.709 -0.201 
       
Extension Game Correlation(M,CL)      
No -0.247 0.131 -1.880 0.060 -0.505 0.010 
Yes 0.218 0.153 1.420 0.155 -0.082 0.517 
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Appendix A: Key Features of Index Based Livestock Insurance (IBLI) Contract 
 
The risk: 
Index based Livestock Insurance (IBLI) is a product that is designed to protect against drought-related 
livestock mortality. 
 
The index:  
As described in Chantarat et al. (2013), the index in IBLI is the predicted livestock mortality rate. It is 
calculated by using a measure of vegetation coverage that is measured by satellite-based sensors, called the 
Normalized Difference Vegetation Index (NDVI). This vegetation measure is fed into a statistical response 
function that was constructed by relating historic drought related livestock mortality data to various 
transformation of the historic NDVI. The parameters estimated from the historic data are used to predict 
drought related livestock mortality from sequences of observed NDVI values. 
 
Contract strike level: 
The index threshold above which payouts are made is called the strike level. The strike level for IBLI is 
15%. In other words, IBLI will compensate if predicted livestock mortality is above 15%. 
 
Geographical coverage of contract and the index:  
Marsabit District is covered by two separate contracts. There is an Upper Marsabit contract consisting of 
Maikona and North Horr divisions, and a Lower Marsabit contract consisting of Central, Gadamoji, 
Laisamis, and Loiyangalani divisions (Figure A1). 
 
The index – predicted livestock mortality – computed and reported at the division level. The five 
division—North Horr, Maikona, Loiyangalani, Laisamis and Central—could each have a different index 
level. Because insurance payments are made according to the index level, this means that IBLI may make 
different indemnity payments across divisions. Every insurance policy holder within the same division, 
however, will receive the same rate of insurance payment, provided that the index is above the strike. 
 
 
Upper Marsabit Contract:  
Lower Marsabit Contract: 
 
 
 
FIGURE A1. IBLI GEOGRAPHICAL COVERAGE 
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Contract premium rates and indemnity payments: 
Premiums are different between the two contract regions to reflect their differences in historical risk of 
livestock mortality. Premium rates are reported as a percent of the value of insured livestock. From first 
initial sales in January of 2010 through 2012, the unsubsidized and loaded premiums were 5.4% and 9.2% 
in the lower and upper IBLI contract regions, respectively. At that time, those premiums were subsidized 
by about 40% so that pastoralists in the lower and upper regions purchased IBLI coverage at a rate of 5.5% 
and 3.25%, respectively.  
 
The standard livestock types for a pastoral herd will be covered: camels, cattle, sheep and goats.  
To arrive at a value for the insured herd, the four livestock types will be transformed into a standard 
livestock unit known as a Tropical Livestock Unit (TLU). TLU is calculated as follows: 1 Camel = 1.4 
TLU, 1 Cattle = 1 TLU and 1 goat/sheep = 0.1 TLU. Once total TLU are calculated, the value of the total 
herd is computed based on average historical prices for livestock across Marsabit, at a set price per TLU 
insured of Ksh 15,000. The premiums are then applied to the insured value to arrive at the amount one pays 
for IBLI coverage for the year. 
 
There are no indemnity payments if the index falls below the strike. If the index exceeds the strike, 
indemnity payments are calculated as the product of the value of the insured herd and difference between 
the predicted livestock mortality and the deductible. 
 
Time Coverage of IBLI: 
The figure below presents the time coverage of the IBLI. The annual contract begins at the close of a 
marketing window, either March 1st or October 1st. Contracts are sold only within a two month (January-
February of August-September) time frame as the rainy season that typically begins right after that window 
may give the potential buyer information about the likely range conditions of the season to come that would 
affect purchase decisions. This annual contract has two potential payout periods: at the end of the long dry 
season based on the October 1st index reading and at the end of the short dry season based on the March 1st 
index readings. At these points of time, if the index exceeds 15%, active policy holders receive an indemnity 
payment. 
 
 
 
FIGURE A2. TEMPORAL STRUCTURE OF IBLI CONTRACT 
  
Jan     Feb       Mar       Apr      May     Jun       Jul      Aug      Sep      Oct       Nov      Dec      Jan      Feb
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Indemnity payment is made if IBLI is triggered
Period of NDVI observations
For constructing SRSD
mortality index
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Appendix B. Description of the Key Variables and Analysis of Attrition 
The data used in this research was collected by the IBLI field team in Marsabit, Kenya.  The data was 
collected in four annual survey rounds in October and November. The 16 sublocations included in the 
survey were selected intentionally to represent a wide range of market and ecological conditions.  
Proportional sampling was done at the community level and stratified random sampling was done within 
communities. The survey tool included a wide variety of questions on household’s demographic and 
economic characteristics. It emphasizes livestock related data, such as herd composition and detailed 
monthly livestock intake and offtake. The variable construction and summary statistics are found in 
Tables B1 and B2.  
  
 
TABLE B1. DESCRIPTION OF KEY VARIABLES 
Variable Data 
Frequency 
Description 
Male Annual Sex of the head of household (1=male). 
Age of Head  Annual Age of the head of household (years). 
Education Annual Maximum education level achieved within the household (years). 
Risk Aversion: 
Neutral 
Constant Following Binswanger (1980), households were allowed to choose from a menu of real gambles 
in which level of risk and expected outcome were positively correlated. Each household 
participated in the experiment once during their first survey round. Households are then placed 
into a risk aversion category according to the lottery that they choose. The categories are risk 
neutral, moderately risk averse, and extremely risk averse. 
Risk Aversion: 
Moderate 
Constant 
Risk Aversion: 
Extreme 
Constant 
Dependency Ratio Annual Ratio of members that are younger than 15 years, older than 55 years, disabled, or clinically ill. 
Social Groups Annual A count of the number of informal groups in which the household participates. This variable is 
lagged by one period in the analysis. 
Asset Index Annual The asset index is generated by a factor analysis performed on more than 30 variables capturing 
asset ownership from the following categories: productive assets, household construction 
materials, household facilities, cooking and lighting fuels, and consumer durables. This variable 
is lagged by one period in the analysis. 
Ln income Seasonal Ln(1+ average monthly income) where income is the sum of the value of earnings, milk 
production, livestock slaughter, and livestock sales. Earnings include earnings from sale of 
crops, salaried employment, pensions, casual labor, business, petty trading, gifts, and 
remittances, expressed in Kenyan shillings (Ksh). This variable is lagged by one period. 
Ratio Livestock 
Income 
Seasonal Ratio of income that is generated through milk production, livestock slaughter or livestock 
sales. This variable is lagged by one period in the analysis. 
Herd Size Seasonal Average herd size during the sales window (1 TLU=0.7 camels=1 cattle=10 sheep=10 goats). 
This variable is lagged by one period in the analysis. 
Livestock Mortality 
Rate 
Seasonal Seasonal livestock mortality rate is calculated by dividing total losses within a season by the 
total herd owned within that season. Total herd owned is the sum of beginning herd size and all 
additions to the herd during the season. This variable is lagged by one period in the analysis. 
Risk Constant Within household variance in livestock mortality rate 
Savings Annual A dummy variable that is equal to one if the household has cash savings sufficient to purchase 
IBLI insurance for ten TLUs. Savings are estimated by summing the total monies held at home, 
in merry-go-round groups, in micro-finance institutions, in savings and credit cooperatives, in 
bank accounts, with traders or shops, and in M-Pesa (a mobile-based micro-finance institution) 
accounts. This variable is lagged by one period in the analysis. 
HSNP  Seasonal Participation in HSNP (1=participant). This variable is lagged by one period. 
HSNP Community Seasonal Community is an HSNP target community (1=target community). 
Expected 
Rangeland: 
Good/Normal/Poor 
Annual A set of three dummy variables reflecting that the respondent’s prediction of coming season’s 
rangeland conditions were: much above normal or above normal (Good=1), normal 
(Normal=1), or somewhat below normal or much below normal (Poor=1). 
Ln(Effective Price) Seasonal Log of the price for one TLU of coverage after coupon discounts (ln(Ksh)). 
Observed Design 
Error 
Seasonal The mean observed design error (%). 
(Table continues) 
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(Continued) 
Correlation(M,CL) Constant The correlation between individual and covariate seasonal livestock mortality rates. For 
households with no variation in livestock mortality rate, this is set to zero. 
IBLI game Constant Household participated in the IBLI educational game in 2010 (1=participant). 
IBLI coverage Seasonal Household has existing IBLI coverage (1=true). 
Coupon Seasonal Household received a discount coupon (1=true). 
Pre-Czndvi Seasonal Preceding season’s cumulative standardized normalized difference vegetation index.  
Division Livestock 
Mortality 
Division 
Constant 
The eight-period average loss rate of all households within each division.  
Division Risk Division 
Constant 
The within-household variance in loss rate averaged across all households in each division. 
Division 
Correlation 
Division 
Constant 
The within-household correlation between individual loss rate and covariate loss rate averaged 
across all households in each division. 
 
 
Table B2 provides summary statistics of the key variables, distinguishing between those that purchase 
and those that do not purchase IBLI. IBLI purchasers have lower dependency ratios, face somewhat less 
livestock mortality risk, are less likely to be extremely risk averse in favor of moderately risk averse, and 
more likely to have received a discount coupon in at least one of the sales windows. But, the two groups 
seem to be mostly similar as the discount coupons directly impact effective price and indirectly IBLI 
coverage via price. 
 
 
TABLE B2. SUMMARY STATISTICS 
 
Never Purchase 
(N=450) 
Did Purchase 
(N=382)    
Variable Mean Std. Err. Mean Std. Err. Difference t-stat 
Male 0.57 0.03 0.63 0.04 0.06 1.09  
Age 47.10 1.05 48.67 1.80 1.57 0.76  
Education 3.75 0.25 4.01 0.37 0.26 0.59  
Risk Aversion:        
Neutral 0.26 0.03 0.25 0.04 -0.01 -0.14  
Moderate 0.41 0.04 0.53 0.05 0.12 2.05 ** 
Extreme 0.33 0.03 0.22 0.04 -0.11 -2.28 ** 
Dependency Ratio 0.63 0.01 0.58 0.02 -0.04 -2.08 ** 
Social Groups 0.51 0.04 0.66 0.05 0.15 2.42 ** 
Asset Index -0.14 0.05 -0.11 0.06 0.03 0.32  
Income  7,190 465 6,997 454 -193 -0.30  
Ratio Livestock Income  0.63 0.02 0.63 0.03 0.00 0.11  
Herd Size 15.01 1.02 13.06 1.00 -1.94 -1.35  
Livestock Mortality Rate 0.15 0.01 0.13 0.01 -0.02 -2.80 *** 
Savings 0.08 0.01 0.08 0.01 0.00 -0.16  
HSNP 0.27 0.02 0.26 0.03 -0.01 -0.27  
HSNP Community 0.74 0.03 0.65 0.04 -0.08 -1.80 * 
Expected Rangeland Conditions:        
Good 0.45 0.01 0.45 0.02 0.00 0.08  
Normal 0.34 0.01 0.31 0.02 -0.03 -1.34  
Poor 0.21 0.02 0.24 0.02 0.03 0.97  
Pre-Czndvi -2.77 0.09 -2.99 0.12 -0.22 -1.43  
IBLI Coverage 0.00 0.00 0.13 0.00 0.13 35.24 *** 
Risk (X 100) 5.84 0.52 4.05 0.33 -1.79 -2.92 *** 
Correlation(M, CL) 0.44 0.02 0.46 0.03 0.02 0.43  
IBLI Game 0.24 0.03 0.24 0.03 0.00 -0.02  
Ln(Effective Price) 6.22 0.01 6.14 0.01 -0.07 -4.09 *** 
Observed Design Error (%) 2.29 0.07 2.51 0.07 0.21 2.12 ** 
Coupon 0.55 0.02 0.64 0.02 0.09 2.78 *** 
Notes: This table only includes the 832 balanced panel households in order to correctly categorize the “Never Purchase” households and maintain 
consistency in the periods and shocks captured in the summary statistics. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Source: Authors’ calculations. 
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The asset index is constructed by performing a factor analysis on a set of variables meant to capture 
variation in household wealth.  This approach is discussed in Sahn and Stifle (2000). The variables focus 
on five general categories: household construction materials, household facilities, cooking and lighting 
fuels, and household durables. Because the list of possible durables is extremely long (more than 70), they 
are aggregated by value (small, medium, large) and use (productive, other) except for large assets which 
are divided into those with motors and those without. Categorization was performed by the authors and is 
clearly not the only method for dividing or aggregating the long list of assets. When in doubt as to which 
category to place an item, we relied on the frequency of ownership to guild our decision. Table B3 includes 
the descriptions of each variable and the factor loadings, which were estimated using the variables listed 
and division year fixed effects.  
 
TABLE B3. ASSET INDEX 
Variable Description 
Factor 
Loading 
Improved Wall =1 if walls are stone, brick, cement, corrugated iron, mud plastered with cement, or tin 0.132 
Improved Floor =1 if floor is cement, tile, or wood 0.130 
Improved Toilet =1 if toilet is flush or covered latrine 0.128 
Improved Light  =1 if main source of lighting is electricity, gas, solar 0.118 
Improved cooking 
appliance  
=1 if main cooking appliance is jiko, kerosene stove, gas cooker, or electric cooker 
0.077 
Improved Fuel  =1 if main cooking fuel is electricity, paraffin, gas or charcoal 0.064 
Improved furniture  Total number of the following assets: metal trunks, mosquito nets, modern chairs, modern tables, 
wardrobes, mattresses and modern beds 
0.165 
Water Source: Open =1 if main water source is river, lake, pond, unprotected well or unprotected spring 0.004 
Water Source: Protected =1 if main water source is protected spring or protected well 0.004 
Water Source: Borehole =1 if main water source is a borehole -0.008 
Water source: Tap =1 if main water source is a public or private tap 0.040 
Water Source: Rainwater 
catchment 
=1 if main water source is a rainwater catchment (usually cement or plastic) 
0.079 
Water Source: tanker =1 if main water source is water tanker (usually associated with NGO and food aid activities during 
drought) 
0.021 
Education Maximum household education 0.121 
Total cash savings Total monies held at home, in merry-go-round groups, in micro-finance institutions, in savings and 
credit cooperatives, in bank accounts, with traders or shops, and in M-Pesa (a mobile-based micro-
finance institution) accounts. 
0.085 
Land Hectares owned 0.051 
Irrigation =1 if household owns irrigated land 0.033 
Poultry Number of chickens 0.081 
Donkeys Number of donkeys 0.018 
Very small Total number of the following assets: gourds, cups, scissors, and needle and thread sets. 0.040 
Small tools Total number of the following assets: anvils, panier, sickle, pickaxe, hoe, spade, machetes, spears, bows, 
club, chisels, hammers, files, fishing lines. 
0.126 
Small other Total number of the following assets: musical instruments, traditional tools, bells, knifes, basins, 
sufirias, thermoses, buckets, wristwatches, jewelry  
0.053 
Medium tools Total number of the following assets: Wheelbarrows, fishing nets, mobile phones, washing machines, 
spinning machines, weaving machines, sewing machines, bicycles, and plows. 
0.164 
Medium other Total number of the following assets: water tank, jerry can, paraffin lamp, water drum, kerosene stove, 
charcoal stoves, ovens and radios.  
0.135 
Large  Total number of the following assets: animal carts, shops, stalls and boats. 0.037 
Large with motor Total number of the following assets: cars, motorbikes and tractors. 0.089 
Notes: Division*period dummies included in the factor analysis. 
 
 
Attrition rates averaged about 4% per year and the rate of attrition was similar between survey rounds. 
Table B4 provides details on the differences between full balanced panel households and those that left. 
Note that participation in the IBLI extension game, the discount coupon, effective price, expected 
conditions, and design error are all related to time so that we expect there to be systematic differences in 
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those variables between those whom we observe in all periods and those that exit, due purely to exogenous 
factors. 
  
TABLE B4. SUMMARY STATISTICS FOR THOSE THAT STAYED AND THOSE THAT LEFT/ENTERED THE SURVEY 
  
Full Panel Left/Entered 
      
(N=832) (N=94) 
Variable Mean Std. Err. Mean Std. Err. Difference t-stat 
Gender  0.60 0.03 0.67 0.06 0.07 1.11  
Age 4.78 0.10 4.73 0.18 -0.05 -0.24  
Education 3.86 0.21 4.24 0.49 0.37 0.70  
Risk Aversion: Neutral 0.26 0.02 0.33 0.05 0.08 1.35  
Risk Aversion: Moderate 0.46 0.03 0.35 0.05 -0.11 -1.96 * 
Risk Aversion: Extreme 0.28 0.03 0.32 0.06 0.04 0.63  
Dependency Ratio 0.61 0.01 0.58 0.02 -0.02 -1.03  
Social Groups 0.58 0.03 0.57 0.08 -0.01 -0.17  
Asset Index -0.12 0.04 -0.18 0.08 -0.06 -0.68  
Income (Kshs monthly) 7,103 325 7,266 939 164 0.16  
Ratio Livestock Income  0.63 0.02 0.52 0.04 -0.11 -2.43 ** 
Herd Size 14.13 0.72 20.55 2.68 6.42 2.31 ** 
Livestock Mortality Rate 0.14 0.00 0.16 0.01 0.02 1.67 * 
Savings 0.08 0.01 0.10 0.03 0.02 0.65  
HSNP 0.26 0.02 0.17 0.03 -0.09 -2.36 ** 
Expected Conditions: Good 0.45 0.01 0.68 0.03 0.22 6.77 *** 
Expected conditions: Normal 0.32 0.01 0.18 0.02 -0.14 -5.87 *** 
Expected Conditions: Poor 0.22 0.01 0.14 0.02 -0.08 -3.06 *** 
Risk 0.05 0.00 0.06 0.01 0.01 1.46  
Correlation(M, CL) 0.45 0.02 0.68 0.05 0.23 4.38 *** 
IBLI game 0.24 0.02 0.22 0.05 -0.02 -0.28  
Ln(effective price) 6.18 0.01 6.31 0.03 0.12 4.04 *** 
Observed Design Error (%) 2.39 0.05 1.34 0.20 -1.05 -5.16 *** 
Coupon 0.59 0.02 0.50 0.05 -0.10 -1.79 * 
 
 
The survey teams used a census of households with herd sizes in order to replace exit households with 
households from the same wealth stratum. Thus we expect that the exiting and replacement households are 
similar. Descriptive statistics are found in Table B5. Most of the systematic differences are likely due to 
duration of survey participation and likelihood of participating during certain periods rather than actual 
differences between households. The variables that are most worrisome are herd size, education and ratio 
of income from livestock, which indicate that replacement households are less educated, have much smaller 
herds, and are more dependent on those herds than those that left. This is most likely a result of over-
sampling in the wealthy household strata, which leaves fewer eligible replacements for attrited wealthy 
households.34 
 
  
                                                   
34 Large portions of the middle and high wealth strata were sampled in some smaller communities.  In such cases, finding within 
strata replacement households can be difficult. Pastoral mobility and demand for herding labor far from households and community 
centers further exacerbates the challenges of replacing households from an already attenuated roster.  
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TABLE B5. SUMMARY STATISTICS FOR ENTRY VS. EXIT HOUSEHOLDS 
  
Exit Enter 
     
(N=91) (N=91) 
Variable Mean Std. Err. Mean Std. Err. Difference t-stat 
Gender  0.63 0.07 0.75 0.09 0.12 1.09  
Age 4.69 0.23 4.85 0.33 0.16 0.40  
Education 4.71 0.59 2.96 0.97 -1.75 -1.55  
Risk Aversion: Neutral 0.28 0.06 0.48 0.11 0.20 1.61  
Risk Aversion: Moderate 0.35 0.06 0.35 0.10 0.00 0.02  
Risk Aversion: Extreme 0.37 0.07 0.17 0.07 -0.20 -2.02 ** 
Social Groups 0.60 0.03 0.53 0.04 -0.07 -1.34  
Dependency Ratio 0.54 0.09 0.63 0.14 0.08 0.49  
Asset Index -0.15 0.10 -0.29 0.14 -0.14 -0.83  
Income (Ksh monthly) 7,804 1,304 5,829 722 -1,975 -1.32  
Ratio livestock Income  0.46 0.05 0.69 0.05 0.23 3.13 *** 
Herd Size 24.18 3.57 10.84 1.89 -13.34 -3.29 *** 
Livestock Mortality Rate 0.16 0.02 0.15 0.02 -0.01 -0.44  
Savings 0.12 0.05 0.05 0.03 -0.06 -1.15  
HSNP 0.15 0.04 0.23 0.07 0.08 0.96  
Expected Conditions: Good 0.70 0.04 0.62 0.06 -0.09 -1.19 *** 
Expected Conditions: Normal 0.17 0.03 0.20 0.04 0.03 0.51 *** 
Expected Conditions: Poor 0.13 0.02 0.19 0.05 0.06 1.04  
Risk 0.07 0.01 0.05 0.01 -0.02 -0.89  
Correlation(M, CL) 0.73 0.06 0.54 0.10 -0.18 -1.56  
Ln(Effective Price) 0.30 0.07 0.01 0.01 -0.29 -4.24 *** 
Observed Design Error 6.35 0.04 6.18 0.05 -0.17 -2.80 *** 
IBLI Game 0.61 0.14 3.31 0.37 2.70 6.85 *** 
Coupon 0.65 0.07 0.30 0.04 -0.35 -4.32 *** 
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Appendix C: Validity of Excludable Variable 
We include a dummy variable to indicate that the household received a discount coupon in the first stage 
selection equation but exclude it from the demand equation. The selection equation estimates found in Table 
E1 and Table 8 clearly indicate that receiving a coupon has a large, positive, and statistically significant 
impact on the likelihood of purchasing IBLI, even after accounting for size of the discount the coupon 
offered (β=0.9866, p<0.01). This effect seems purely a randomized treatment that should be irrelevant to 
purchase volume conditional on uptake. So that variable seems a strong candidate for exclusion from the 
second stage estimation of uptake volume. 
 
Although there is no agreed upon method for testing excludability of a candidate instrument and it is 
rarely be done with selection models, we venture to provide some statistical support that the exclusion of 
that indicator variable does not cause bias in the demand estimates. Because we only have one exclusion 
variable, our tests rest on identification through nonlinearity on the probit model, which is likely to be very 
weak. First, we include the coupon dummy variable in the second stage regression. The coefficient on the 
coupon dummy is negative and statistically insignificant (beta=-0.122, p-value=0.366). Comparing this set 
of estimates with those estimated with the coupon dummy excluded, we fail to reject the null hypothesis 
that the joint change to remaining estimates is zero (χ2(45)=1.62, p-value=1.00). More specifically, we 
would expect a large change between the two models in the estimated parameter on the effective price if 
the receiving a coupon played an important role in determining levels of demand beyond providing a price 
discount. Testing for a difference in the two price parameter estimates, we cannot reject the null of no 
change (χ2(1)=0.87, p-value=0.352). Of course, this does not mean that the variable should be omitted, only 
that it has little independent effect on the level of purchase and does not result in large shifts in parameter 
values when included. 
 
We can also check if the errors estimated by the demand equation without the coupon dummy vary by 
coupon status. Because selection is controlled for through the inverse Mills ratio and coupons were 
randomly distributed, there should be no omitted variable bias in the demand equation parameter estimates 
except potentially in effective price, but that bias was ruled out in step one. A t-test of the demand residuals 
over the coupon status does not reject the null of equal errors between those who received a coupon and 
those who did not (difference=0.054, t-statistic(529)=0.756). 
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Appendix D. Coefficient Estimates of Uptake and Demand for ILBI 
TABLE D1. COEFFICIENT ESTIMATES FOR PROBIT SELECTION  
  Pooled Conditional FE 
VARIABLES Coefficient Std. Err. Coefficient Std. Err. 
Household Period-Specific Characteristics:    
Male 0.1493 (0.1006) 0.1412 (0.1018) 
Dependency Ratio -0.4211* (0.2449) 0.0565 (0.4149) 
Social Groups L 0.1232*** (0.0475) -0.0018 (0.0553) 
Asset Index L -0.2876*** (0.1069) -0.3400** (0.1323) 
Asset Index2 L 0.0728*** (0.0266) 0.1703* (0.0938) 
Ln(income) L -0.0632 (0.0561) -0.0049 (0.0264) 
Ln(income)2 L  0.0053 (0.0052) 0.0078 (0.0053) 
Ratio income livestock L -0.3043** (0.1550) -0.1567 (0.1553) 
TLU L 0.0030 (0.0058) 0.0087* (0.0045) 
TLU2 L -0.0001 (0.0001) -0.0002 (0.0001) 
Livestock Mortality Rate L 0.0149 (0.1728) 0.1351 (0.1795) 
Savings (10TLU) L -0.1635 (0.1579) -0.2248 (0.1879) 
HSNP L 0.2397** (0.1061) 0.2608** (0.1057) 
Household Averages Characteristics:     
Dependency Ratio   -0.6699** (0.2723) 
Social Groups    0.2663*** (0.0811) 
Asset Index    -0.0418 (0.0950) 
Ln(income)   0.0193 (0.0414) 
Ratio income livestock    -0.0967 (0.2127) 
TLU    -0.0046 (0.0032) 
Livestock Mortality Rate    -0.5062 (0.9822) 
Savings (10TLU)    -0.3923 (0.3225) 
Expected Rangelands: Good#   -0.2798 (0.3097) 
Expected Rangelands: Normal#   -0.3487 (0.3070) 
Prospective Adverse Selection:     
Expected conditions: Good# -0.2348** (0.1040) -0.1451 (0.1135) 
Expected conditions: Normal# -0.0999 (0.0991) 0.0034 (0.1050) 
Pre-CZNDVI -0.0045 (0.0062) -0.0041 (0.0061) 
Division Livestock Mortality 0.2603*** (0.0907) 0.2693*** (0.0913) 
Division Risk -0.2381** (0.0945) -0.2749*** (0.0959) 
Division Correlation 1.2845* (0.7437) 1.3848* (0.7789) 
Product Related Characteristics :     
Existing IBLI Coverage 0.1089 (0.2207) 0.0806 (0.2326) 
Risk -3.1565*** (1.0903) -1.5218 (1.6403) 
Correlation 0.0008 (0.1388) 0.0091 (0.1428) 
Extension Game -0.0360 (0.1444) -0.0168 (0.1452) 
Correlation X Game 0.1197 (0.2712) 0.1401 (0.2716) 
Ln(price) 0.2732 (0.2254) 0.2419 (0.2181) 
Observed Design Error (ODE) 0.4001** (0.1592) 0.3990** (0.1727) 
Ln(price) X ODE -0.0736*** (0.0269) -0.0730** (0.0292) 
Coupon Dummy 0.8123*** (0.1472) 0.8011*** (0.1384) 
     
Observations 3,292  3,292  
F-statistic 4.11  5.10  
P-value (model) 0.00   0.00  
Notes: Additional covariates not listed above include age, age2, average age (for the Conditional FE Model), education, level of risk aversion, 
HSNP Village, and a constant. L Variable is lagged one period. #Omitted variable is Expected conditions: poor. Robust and clustered standard 
errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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TABLE D2. ESTIMATED DEMAND COEFFICIENTS, CONDITIONAL ON PURCHASE 
  Pooled Conditional FE 
VARIABLES Coefficient Std. Err. Coefficient Std. Err. 
Household Period-Specific Characteristics:    
Male 0.0597 (0.0829) 0.0883 (0.0829) 
Dependency Ratio -0.3643 (0.2270) -0.0773 (0.6169) 
Social Groups L 0.0400 (0.0464) -0.0082 (0.0487) 
Asset Index L 0.1500 (0.0961) 0.2368** (0.1036) 
Asset Index2 L -0.0046 (0.0235) -0.0659 (0.0687) 
Ln(income) L 0.0821 (0.0592) 0.0454** (0.0226) 
Ln(income)2 L  -0.0038 (0.0050) -0.0044 (0.0054) 
Ratio income livestock L -0.3690*** (0.1289) -0.4424*** (0.1605) 
TLU L 0.0066 (0.0053) 0.0099* (0.0056) 
TLU2 L -0.0001 (0.0001) -0.0002** (0.0001) 
Livestock Mortality Rate L 0.0061 (0.1817) -0.0091 (0.1696) 
Savings (10TLU) L 0.1428 (0.1466) 0.2676 (0.1982) 
HSNP L -0.0684 (0.0932) -0.1545 (0.1076) 
Household Averages Characteristics:     
Dependency Ratio   -0.4075* (0.2449) 
Social Groups    0.0998 (0.0681) 
Asset Index    0.1970** (0.0813) 
Ln(income)   0.0189 (0.0330) 
Ratio income livestock    -0.0111 (0.1900) 
TLU    0.0004 (0.0049) 
Livestock Mortality Rate    0.0523 (0.7496) 
Savings (10TLU)    0.0861 (0.2566) 
Expected Rangelands: Good#   -0.6382*** (0.2469) 
Expected Rangelands: Normal#   -0.5968** (0.2455) 
Prospective Adverse Selection:     
Expected conditions: Good# -0.3915*** (0.0869) -0.2709*** (0.0946) 
Expected conditions: Normal# -0.3270*** (0.0933) -0.2118** (0.0842) 
Pre-CZNDVI -0.0037 (0.0047) -0.0100* (0.0056) 
Division Livestock Mortality -0.1804** (0.0829) -0.1865** (0.0767) 
Division Risk 0.1682* (0.0886) 0.2002** (0.0842) 
Division Correlation -0.7921 (0.8214) -0.9204 (0.7385) 
Product Related Characteristics :     
Existing IBLI Coverage -0.1203 (0.0979) -0.2114** (0.1037) 
Risk -1.1626 (1.0886) -0.0205 (1.3111) 
Correlation -0.2779** (0.1205) -0.2472* (0.1312) 
Extension Game -0.2157* (0.1106) -0.1840* (0.1113) 
Correlation X Game 0.5103** (0.2057) 0.4648** (0.2139) 
Ln(price) -0.4311** (0.1829) -0.3880* (0.2016) 
Observed Design Error (ODE) 0.0465 (0.1347) 0.0380 (0.1222) 
Ln(price) X ODE -0.0089 (0.0224) -0.0073 (0.0205) 
     
Observations 3,292  3,292  
F-statistic 4.11  5.10  
P-value (model) 0.00  0  
Notes: Additional covariates not listed above include age, age2, average age (Conditional FE Model), education, level of risk aversion, HSNP 
Village, inverse Mills Ratio, and a constant. L Variable is lagged one period. #Omitted variable is Expected conditions: poor. Robust and clustered 
standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Appendix E: Shapley Goodness of Fit Decomposition 
A Shapley’s goodness of fit (GOF) decomposition is used to determine the level of variation in demand 
that is captured by categories of variables (Kolenikov & Shorrocks 2005; Shapley 1953; Shorrocks 2013).35 
The variable categories include: household demographics, household finances, prospective intertemporal 
adverse selection, prospective spatial adverse selection, idiosyncratic risk & knowledge, design risk & price, 
other, and the instrument variable.  A two-stage Heckman approach, rather than the maximum likelihood 
approach used in the main body of the paper, is used here in order to examine the contributions of the 
variable groups in both the uptake and demand analysis. In addition, we use the pooled, rather than 
conditional fixed effects, approach here in order to reduce the computational burden.  Notice that the pooled 
and conditional fixed effects estimates are generally very similar.   
 
Tables E1 and E2 include the two-stage estimates and estimated group contributions to each stage’s 
(uptake and level of purchase) GOF.  The pooled maximum likelihood estimates from the Heckman 
selection model (from Table D1 and Table D2) are also included as evidence that the two models result in 
very similar estimates and that the decomposition of the two-stage estimates are likely to be reflective of 
the contributions in the maximum likelihood Heckman model.36    
 
Household characteristics clearly play a role in uptake but are unable to account for even half of the 
variation captured by the model (Table E1).  Temporal and spatial adverse selection provide similar 
contributions and their combined impacts are similar to that of the relative importance of covariate risk.  
The three design risk and price variables account for 18% of the Pseudo R2 measure, more than any other 
group except for our instrumental variable.       
 
The role of adverse selection in the fit of our model is greater for level of demand than uptake.  Conversely, 
the role of design risk and price has fallen considerably.  In addition, income and wealth have become much 
more important while the importance of covariate risk has changes very little.   
 
In summary, the total contribution made by adverse selection and product related characteristics towards 
the GOF are greater than that of a large set of familiar household characteristics in both uptake and level of 
demand models.  Our models would perform much worse with these crucial estimates of basis risk and 
adverse selection. 
 
  
                                                   
35 We use the STATA user-written command shapley2 (Juárez 2014). 
36  The ML Heckman estimates are generated in a single step so that we cannot examine the goodness of fit 
contributions in each process separately. 
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TABLE F1. DECOMPOSITION OF PSEUDO R2 FOR UPTAKE PROBIT 
  Heckman ML Probit  2 Step Probit Shapley Decomposition of Pseudo R2 
A VARIABLES Coefficient Std. Err. Coefficient Std. Err. 
Household Period-Specific Characteristics: 
Demographics: B     12.40% 
Male 0.1493 (0.1006) 0.1492 (0.1038)  
Dependency Ratio -0.4211* (0.2449) -0.4214* (0.2533)  
Social Groups L 0.1232*** (0.0475) 0.1230** (0.0492)  
Financial:     14.42% 
Asset Index L -0.2876*** (0.1069) -0.2875*** (0.1104)  
Asset Index2 L 0.0728*** (0.0266) 0.0728*** (0.0276)  
Ln(income) L -0.0632 (0.0561) -0.0631 (0.0579)  
Ln(income)2 L  0.0053 (0.0052) 0.0053 (0.0054)  
Ratio income livestock L -0.3043** (0.1550) -0.3044* (0.1594)  
TLU L 0.0030 (0.0058) 0.0030 (0.0060)  
TLU2 L -0.0001 (0.0001) -0.0001 (0.0001)  
Livestock Mortality Rate L 0.0149 (0.1728) 0.0147 (0.1781)  
Savings (10TLU) L -0.1635 (0.1579) -0.1631 (0.1645)  
HSNP L 0.2397** (0.1061) 0.2398** (0.1097)  
Prospective Adverse Selection: 
Intertemporal:     2.46% 
Expected conditions: Good# -0.2348** (0.1040) -0.2346** (0.1081)  
Expected conditions: Normal# -0.0999 (0.0991) -0.0997 (0.1022)  
Pre-CZNDVI -0.0045 (0.0062) -0.0045 (0.0064)  
Spatial:     5.12% 
Division Livestock Mortality 0.2603*** (0.0907) 0.2603*** (0.0937)  
Division Risk -0.2381** (0.0945) -0.2381** (0.0974)  
Division Correlation 1.2845* (0.7437) 1.2838* (0.7666)  
Product Related Characteristics : 
Idiosyncratic Risk & Knowledge:    5.46% 
Risk -3.1565*** (1.0903) -3.1567*** (1.1241)  
Correlation 0.0008 (0.1388) 0.0007 (0.1439)  
Extension Game -0.0360 (0.1444) -0.0359 (0.1509)  
Correlation X Game 0.1197 (0.2712) 0.1197 (0.2814)  
Design Risk & Price:     21.13% 
Ln(price) 0.2732 (0.2254) 0.2733 (0.2326)  
Observed Design Error (ODE) 0.4001** (0.1592) 0.4000** (0.1645)  
Ln(price) X ODE -0.0736*** (0.0269) -0.0736*** (0.0278)  
Instrumental Variable:     35.32% 
Coupon Dummy 0.8123*** (0.1472) 0.8124*** (0.1515)  
      
Observations 3,292  3,292   
F-statistic [Wald χ2] 4.11  [165.48]   
P-value (model) 0  0   
Pseudo R2    0.135     
Notes: A The Shapley decomposition is performed on eight groups of variables indicated by the bold labels on the left using the 2 -stage probit 
estimates. A group containing existing IBLI coverage and an indicator that the household is in an HSNP targeted community was also included in 
the regressions and decomposition; its Shapley contribution was 3.82%.  B Additional covariates in the demographics group include age, age2, 
education, level of risk aversion, and existing coverage. L Variable is lagged one period. #Omitted variable is Expected conditions: poor. Robust 
and clustered standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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TABLE E2. DECOMPOSITION OF R2 FOR LEVEL OF PURCHASE, CONDITIONAL ON PURCHASE 
  Demand (MLE) Demand (2 Step) Shapley 
Decomposition 
of Pseudo R2 A VARIABLES Coefficient Std. Err. Coefficient Std. Err. 
Household Period-Specific Characteristics:     
Demographics: B     14.08% 
Male 0.0597 (0.0829) 0.0602 (0.0889)  
Dependency Ratio -0.3643 (0.2270) -0.3650 (0.2443)  
Social Groups L 0.0400 (0.0464) 0.0405 (0.0499)  
Financial:     30.85% 
Asset Index L 0.1500 (0.0961) 0.1489 (0.1058)  
Asset Index2 L -0.0046 (0.0235) -0.0042 (0.0258)  
Ln(income) L 0.0821 (0.0592) 0.0821 (0.0631)  
Ln(income)2 L  -0.0038 (0.0050) -0.0038 (0.0053)  
Ratio income livestock L -0.3690*** (0.1289) -0.3705*** (0.1408)  
Livestock Mortality Rate L 0.0066 (0.0053) 0.0066 (0.0057)  
TLU L -0.0001 (0.0001) -0.0001 (0.0001)  
TLU2 L 0.0061 (0.1817) 0.0068 (0.1952)  
Savings (10TLU) L 0.1428 (0.1466) 0.1417 (0.1596)  
HSNP L -0.0684 (0.0932) -0.0674 (0.1004)  
Prospective Adverse Selection:      
Intertemporal:     18.39% 
Expected conditions: Good# -0.3915*** (0.0869) -0.3924*** (0.0947)  
Expected conditions: Normal# -0.3270*** (0.0933) -0.3273*** (0.1005)  
Pre-CZNDVI -0.0037 (0.0047) -0.0037 (0.0051)  
Spatial:     13.84% 
Division Livestock Mortality -0.1804** (0.0829) -0.1798** (0.0897)  
Division Risk 0.1682* (0.0886) 0.1674* (0.0956)  
Division Correlation -0.7921 (0.8214) -0.7894 (0.8859)  
Product Related Characteristics :      
Idiosyncratic Risk & Knowledge:    5.42 % 
Risk -0.1203 (0.0979) -1.1753 (1.1859)  
Correlation -1.1626 (1.0886) -0.2778** (0.1302)  
Extension Game -0.2779** (0.1205) -0.2156* (0.1194)  
Correlation X Game -0.2157* (0.1106) 0.5100** (0.2216)  
Design Risk & Price:     15.68% 
Ln(price) -0.4311** (0.1829) -0.4326** (0.1981)  
Observed Design Error (ODE) 0.0465 (0.1347) 0.0480 (0.1462)  
Ln(price) X ODE -0.0089 (0.0224) -0.0091 (0.0244)  
      
Observations 3,292  547   
F-statistic 4.11  4.49   
P-value (model) 0.00  0.00   
R2   0.2582   
Notes: A The Shapley decomposition is performed on seven groups of variables indicated by the bold labels on the left. A group containing existing 
IBLI coverage, an indicator that the household is in an HSNP targeted community, and the inverse Mills Ratio was also included in the regressions; 
its Shapley contribution was 2.45%.  B Additional covariates in the demographics group include age, age2, education, level of risk aversion.  L 
Variable is lagged one period. #Omitted variable is Expected conditions: poor. Robust and clustered standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, 
** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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